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ABSTRACT 
The development strategy of the European Union (EU) in Afghanistan suffers from two 
major defects: inadequate coordination between the EU donors, national and collective, 
and an overemphasis on short-term projects that do not promote sustainable economic 
growth. This thesis examines the underlying causes of these defects and analyzes two 
methods that might address them. First, it assesses the possible benefits of appointing an 
EU or United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan “super envoy” to synchronize 
EU donor activities. Second, it uses a regional development strategy case study called 
“Nangarhar Inc” to examine techniques that the EU donors could emulate to enable a 
revised EU strategy to attain its fullest potential. The analysis indicates that an EU “super 
envoy” might be able to harness the full weight of the EU donors in regional 
development strategies undertaking large-scale projects beyond the capabilities of most 
donors in Afghanistan. The thesis concludes that by promoting private-sector-led 
economic growth through regional strategies, a unified EU strategy might provide 
sustainable development in Afghanistan that could contribute to a notable reduction in the 
requirement for international donor intervention in the mid to long term.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores methods by which the development strategy of the European 
Union (EU) in Afghanistan could be improved. It focuses on two areas, EU development 
strategy adjustment and EU development effort coordination. These areas are explored 
following an examination of the current EU apparatus for development decision making 
and implementation, including the rivalry for responsibilities and competences among the 
Council of the European Union, the European Commission (EC), and other EU agencies. 
This analysis considers the stated development objectives for Afghanistan generated by 
international organizations (IO) that influence EU donors and the institutions and 
member states of the EU. It also discusses the coordination of development agencies 
sponsored by EU member states such as Ireland’s Development Cooperation Ireland 
(DCI), Sweden’s Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and 
the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID). The overall 
research question explored in this thesis is: “How could the European Union’s 
development strategy in Afghanistan be made more effective?”   
B. IMPORTANCE 
For various reasons, Afghanistan represents an important foreign policy challenge 
for numerous nations. The Al Qaeda orchestrated terrorist attacks of September 2001 
figure prominently in the rationale for engagement in Afghanistan for many nations, most 
notably the United States. For these nations, one of the primary objectives of intervention 
in the country is “to put an end to the use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorism,” as 
stated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1383, adopted on December 6, 
2001.1 Under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 1386, 43 nations provided 
approximately 85,795 peacekeeping troops for the International Security Assistance 
                                                 
1 United Nations, “Security Council Resolutions – 2001,”  
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm (accessed August 7, 2009). 
 2
Force (ISAF) as of February 1, 2010.2 In monetary terms, 46 donor countries and 
agencies donated more than $57.1 billion for reconstruction in Afghanistan during the 
period 2001–2009.3  
Success in Afghanistan is also critical to the European Union, which aims to 
achieve a number of broad objectives in this country. These include poverty reduction (in 
keeping with the UN’s Millennium Development Goals), regional stability, strengthening 
of ties between Europe and Asia, protection of human rights, poppy eradication, good 
governance, and the rule of law.4 These are basic objectives in the European Security 
Strategy as well as the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration, and they describe some of the 
reasons why the EU is involved in development in Afghanistan.5 
In support of these objectives, the European Union6 has heavily invested in 
Afghanistan, with a total of about €8 billion committed in 2002–2010.7 However, 
according to Daniel Korski, a Senior Policy Fellow for the European Council for Foreign 
Relations, far more is at stake than simple financial concerns: “In Europe defeat in 
Afghanistan would imperil the effort to develop a common EU foreign policy, thereby 
                                                 
2 NATO, “ISAF Troops in Numbers (Placemat),” International Security Assistance Force. February 1, 
2010. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf (accessed February 24, 2010). The placemat 
notes that exact numbers cannot be ascertained.  
3 United States. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Report to Congress,” 
January 30, 2009. http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jan09.aspx (accessed July 28, 2009). 39. 
4 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007–2013,” 
European Union (EU) and Afghanistan. 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/ 
index_en.htm  (accessed July 28, 2009). 21; Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World. Brussels: European Union, 12 December 2008. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=En (accessed July 28, 2009). 7. 
5 European Union, “Consilium – European Security Strategy,” A Secure Europe in a Better World – 
The European Security Strategy. December 12, 2003. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx 
?id=266&lang=EN (accessed August 14, 2009). 4–6; Council of the European Union, EU-Afghanistan 
Joint Declaration: Committing to a New EU-Afghan Partnership Strasbourg 16 November 2005. European 
Union: External Relations. November 16, 2005. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/ 
st14/st14519.en05.pdf (accessed December 2, 2009). 2. 
6 In this thesis, unless otherwise noted, the terms “European Union” and “EU donors” include both the 
institutions of the EU as well as its member states. 
7 EU Council Secretariat, “EU Engagement In Afghanistan,” http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cmsUpload/090330-EU_engagement_Afghanistan.pdf (accessed July 29, 2009). 1. 
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damaging the EU’s credibility at home and abroad. Europe’s financial, military and 
political investment in Afghanistan is far too big to allow defeat to go unnoticed.”8 
Yet, even with so much at stake, the EU has failed to synchronize the significant 
tools at its disposal. In Korski’s opinion, “Whether in Brussels or Kabul, Europeans have 
failed to define and implement a united strategy for Afghanistan.”9 This is perhaps 
nowhere more evident than in the reconstruction and development arena.  
Given what is at stake for the EU, an effective development and reconstruction 
strategy is a critical element of EU foreign and security policy. Moreover, because the 
European Union is a leading donor in Afghanistan, the implementation of a coordinated 
and effective EU development policy in Afghanistan will set an example of great interest 
for the other donors. This thesis explores how to reshape the EU development strategy in 
Afghanistan and thereby make it more effective.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
1. Problems/Issues 
• What are the development objectives of the European Union in 
Afghanistan? An analysis of EU stated objectives in Afghanistan is critical to 
understanding the framework for EU development and reconstruction strategies, projects, 
and shortfalls. The point of departure of this thesis resides in the EU’s stated objectives.   
• To what extent has the EU been effective in achieving these objectives? A 
comparison of the EU’s stated objectives with its achievements in Afghanistan illustrates 
the EU’s limited effectiveness to date in meeting its objectives.  
• What factors explain the EU’s lack of effectiveness in achieving its 
objectives?  
• What factors within the EU decision making and policy implementation 
apparatus hinder effective development efforts? The conflicts within the current 
                                                 
8 Daniel Korski, Afghanistan: Europe's Forgotten War, European Council on Foreign Relations. 
January 31, 2008. http://ecfr.3cdn.net/fcdc73b8da7af85936_q8m6b5o4j.pdf (accessed July 28, 2009). 4. 
 4
structures of the European Union and their sometimes disparate objectives in Afghanistan 
must be outlined and examined. These separate institutions, together with those of EU 
member nations active in Afghanistan, furnish the basis for the lack of EU coordination 
in development efforts.  
• How do the circumstances in Afghanistan hinder effective EU 
development efforts? The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) describes 
the overall Afghan development and reconstruction strategy. The Provincial and District 
Development Plans (PDP/DDPs) are the Afghan vehicles used to pursue this strategy, but 
they are unable to effectively leverage the natural resources available to achieve long-
term sustainable economic growth. Instead of simply “falling in step” behind these 
flawed development strategies promulgated by the Afghan government, the EU could 
find it advantageous to critically examine methods to effectively leverage Afghanistan’s 
natural resources through economic value chains (that is, chains of related natural 
resources in a region). By doing so, the EU could set a positive example for the rest of the 
international donors in Afghanistan. Although the author recognizes that organizations in 
general will be suspicious of any approach not created internally, it is hoped that logical 
solutions that address the problems evident in the current EU development strategy in 
Afghanistan will be considered for implementation. 
2. Hypotheses 
• Regional development strategies pursued by the EU could assist in 
addressing the Afghan development strategy challenges. The disconnect between the 
ANDS and the PDP/DDPs (which are analogous to strategic and tactical plans, respect-
tively) could be addressed by strategies that link the two disconnected ends of the 
spectrum in Afghanistan. An example of an effective regional strategy is available in the 
Nangarhar Regional Development Strategy, or “Nangarhar Inc,” a United States gov-
ernment interagency strategy designed to accomplish this task. If it used “Nangarhar Inc” 
as a model, the EU would be able to redesign its development strategies to more 
effectively achieve the Afghan government’s development vision.   
                                                 
9 Korski, Afghanistan: Europe's Forgotten War, 5. 
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• Gathering behind a single coordinating agency or individual could address 
the coordination challenges. As Giji Gya and Olivier Jacquemet have observed, 
“everybody recognizes the need for coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.”10 
A synchronized and effective EU development strategy cannot exist without a modicum 
of coordination between the EU donors. This is well recognized, but the challenge is how 
to achieve that goal. This thesis examines two possibilities: the EU actively supporting 
the leadership of a single appointed EU agency or individual, or the EU supporting the 
Senior Representative of the UN Secretary General (SR-SG) for the United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) as the coordinator of EU development 
activities.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The EU is firmly established as a key donor in Afghanistan, with recent pledges 
solidifying its commitment for the foreseeable future. Yet, the EU development strategy 
suffers from many of the same problems that affect other donors in this war-torn country. 
Two primary areas of concern in the EU strategy are: difficulties in coordinating EU 
development activities in Afghanistan, and the issue of what strategy to choose in the 
application of EU funds allocated for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.  
This examination of these issues first explores the European Union’s difficulty in 
coordinating its development activities in Afghanistan. This issue is of great concern to 
the EU due to the amount of funds invested as well as the number of EU personnel 
involved in the application of these funds. Equally important is the strategy chosen by the 
European Union. The question remains to the current day: once money has been set aside 
for reconstruction and development, how best to spend it? Because so many development 
and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan have little effect, are sabotaged by insurgents, 
or are misdirected from the beginning due to a lack of understanding of essential aspects 
of Afghan culture, government, and society, the choice of a development strategy is a 
critical one for the European Union.   
                                                 
10 Interview, unnamed source, June 2008, cited in Giji Gya and Olivier Jacquemet, “ESDP and EU 
Mission Update – June 2008,” European Security Review, July 2008: 6. 
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1. The EU Strategy: Where to Spend the Money 
Since the Bonn Conference in 2001, the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy has grown from infancy and the European Union has attempted to dovetail its 
strategy with it. The first European Commission Strategy Paper for 2003–2006, through 
necessity, addressed basic infrastructure needs in Afghanistan. The current EC Country 
Strategy Paper (CSP) covers a five-year period (2007–2013) and states the intent to 
address more long-term needs in Afghanistan with the goal of enabling the Afghan 
government to become more self-sufficient.11 The critical juncture was the London 
Conference in 2006 with the publication of the Afghanistan Compact and the Interim 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS). The ANDS, which was finalized 
in 2008, serves as Afghanistan’s overarching development strategy. It also serves as a 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) designed to diminish poverty, meet the 
Millennium Development Goals, and to qualify for funding from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). EU 
donors are in general agreement that the tenets of the ANDS must be respected when 
considering donor strategies, not only collectively as outlined in the EU’s 2007 
Afghanistan Country Strategy Paper that addresses how best to support the Afghan plan, 
but by individual EU member nations as well.12 
There is logic to the EU’s collective acceptance of the ANDS as a strategic 
document to emulate as the EU strategy. The majority of donors in Afghanistan treat the 
ANDS in a similar manner. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund accept 
                                                 
11 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper,” 3. 
12 European Commission, EU Blue Book 2009: The EU and Afghanistan, 
http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/downloadable_documents/EUBlueBookAfg_2009.pdf (accessed 
November 20, 2009). 23; European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper,” 3–4, 18–19; European 
Commission, “Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007–2010,” 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/csp/mip_07_13_en.pdf (accessed December 6, 2009). 3–
4; European Commission, “State of Play: July 2009,” Europeaid. (accessed December 6, 2009). 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/documents/afgh_state_of_play_july_09.pdf  2; House of 
Commons, International Development Committee – Fourth Report, February 14, 2008. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmintdev/65/6508.htm#a14 (accessed 
November 20, 2009). 7; Aid Harmonization & Alignment, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, March 
2, 2005. http://www.aidharmonization.org/ah-overview/secondary-pages/editable?key=205 (accessed 
February 15, 2010). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness states that “donor countries will base their 
overall support on receiving countries’ national development strategies, institutions, and procedures.” It is 
signed by 18 of the 27 EU member states. 
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the ANDS as a PRSP for loan purposes. The United Nations, through UNAMA (the 
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan), welcomes the ANDS because it 
ostensibly supports basic human rights, including women’s rights, and includes as a 
stated objective the achievement of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. However, 
although the professional development literature has stressed adherence to the tenets 
promoted in the ANDS, there has been little published analysis as to the probable 
effectiveness of the ANDS as a strategy that will achieve sustainable economic growth 
with poverty reduction as its ultimate goal. Numerous sources have simply recommended 
following the ANDS because it is the Afghan government’s plan, and have neglected to 
investigate if it is fundamentally sound or flawed in certain respects. It is this gap that 
merits further research to determine if a better strategy for the EU can be determined.  
2. Competing Strategies Within the European Union 
The lack of coordination between reconstruction and development agencies in 
Afghanistan is widely recognized. This understanding so permeates the literature on 
reconstruction and development in Afghanistan that it is difficult to understand why 
effective solutions have not been implemented. Par for the course is the statement in the 
United Kingdom’s 2008 DfID report that “Problems of donor coordination are leading to 
a proliferation of disparate projects, low local impact of funding and creating a poor 
impression in Afghanistan about donors’ lack of agreement.”13 The EU is no stranger to 
this issue. The key to understanding the lack of coordination in the EU comes with an 
examination of how the EU institutions interact with each other.  
In regard to Afghanistan policy, the competing institutions in the European Union 
include the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European 
Parliament. Although there is not a great deal of literature dealing with internal EU 
responsibility overlap and conflict in regard to Afghanistan and development, there is a 
broader history of overlapping functions and conflict among the main EU institutions.  
                                                 
13 United Kingdom. House of Commons International Development Committee, “Reconstructing 
Afghanistan: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2007–08,” April 24, 
2008. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/gov-response-int-dev-report-afghanistan-2008.pdf 
(accessed November 20, 2009). 9. 
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The European Commission has been active in Afghanistan since the 1980s. In the 
1990s, its activities included humanitarian assistance programs conducted by the 
European Community Humanitarian Office.14 The EC authored the Country Strategy 
Paper on Afghanistan in 2002 and again in 2007. However, simply because the “EU 
strategy” was written by an EU institution has not necessarily led to an effective 
coordination of effort within the European Union. The European Parliament must 
approve the funds that the Commission identifies as needed in Afghanistan for 
development and reconstruction. Although the Parliament has not objected to the 
Commission’s budgetary requests in Afghanistan to date, “The ‘power of the purse’ gave 
the EP [European Parliament] leverage…and allowed it to promote its autonomous policy 
preferences.”15 This has opened the door to possible future contention regarding 
Afghanistan policy. 
Besides overlapping policy responsibilities within the EU structures listed above, 
the EU pillar structure that had been created by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty did not 
always facilitate harmonious EU action. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into 
force in December 2009, all three pillars of the European Union were associated with EU 
operations in Afghanistan. The EC was heavily involved in the First Pillar of the 
European Union, the supranational Community Pillar. The European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) was the most visible manifestation of the Second Pillar—
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).16 In regards to the Third Pillar—Police 
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC)—the CSP noted that “In the sector 
of Justice and Home Affairs, drugs policies in Afghanistan have a clear read across to the 
overarching EU Drugs Strategy.”17 Since the European Commission had less influence in 
the intergovernmental Second and Third Pillars than in the supranational First Pillar (the 
European Community), it is clear that multiple EU institutions were involved in the EU’s 
                                                 
14 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper,” 3. 
15 Brigid Laffan and Johannes Lindner, “The Budget: Who Gets What, When and How?” In Policy-
Making in the European Union, by Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark A. Pollack, 191–212. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 193. 
16 Gya and Jacquemet, “EU Mission Update,” 5. EUPOL Afghanistan, which began on May 20, 2007, 
is an ESDP mission.  
17 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper,” 18–19. 
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Afghanistan strategy prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, making the 
formulation and implementation of a consolidated and unified strategy difficult. It is not 
yet fully clear what effect the Lisbon Treaty will have on the ability of the European 
Union to act in a unified manner.  
This lack of a single unified strategy within the EU is the biggest issue in the 
determination of how to spend funds in Afghanistan. The CSP discusses the efforts of 
cooperating agencies, including those sponsored by individual EU member states. Yet, 
the CSP only notes their contributions, and does not attempt to integrate them into the EU 
plan, which does not realistically constitute a strategy (despite being termed a strategy 
paper). It is noteworthy that in the CSP the European Commission identifies the 
importance of ensuring the coordination of the main donor actors, citing the UK and 
Germany as two of these “main actors.”18 The fact that the institutions of the EU cannot 
direct the donor activities sponsored by EU member states in one coordinated EU effort is 
significant, and highlights the difficulties presented to the EU. As Michael Smith, Brian 
Crowe, and John Peterson noted in The Institutions of the European Union, “EU member 
states have vastly different foreign policy capabilities, and vary sharply in their 
willingness to employ the EU’s complex and often time-consuming procedures.”19 In 
other words, the EU’s supranational character in the First Pillar clearly came into conflict 
in some policy areas with the nature of the Second and Third Pillars—an 
intergovernmental approach favored by the EU member states.20 
According to the CSP, “The European Commission’s development programme in 
Afghanistan is grounded in the objectives set out in Article 177 of the Treaty of the 
European Union.” This document sets broad objectives for development cooperation.21 
The call for “coordination and consultation between the Community and the Member 
                                                 
18 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper,” 21. 
19 Michael E. Smith, Brian Crowe, and John Peterson, “International Interests: The Common Foreign 
and Security Policy,” In The Institutions of the European Union, by John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, 
252–271. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 254. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Europa, Treaty on European Union, http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm 
/11992M.html#0001000001 (accessed December 6, 2009), cited in European Commission, “Country 
Strategy Paper,” 30. The CSP also refers to Article 130u in the Treaty on European Union. 
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States on their aid programmes”22 indicates that there are shortcomings in this respect. 
The European Commission cannot direct a coordinated development program in 
Afghanistan when the mandates and objectives of the European Union and the member 
states are not aligned, and the EU does not have the authority to direct a consolidated 
strategy. In Afghanistan, where EU member states are involved in pursuing their national 
foreign policies, “The Commission is only ‘fully associated’ (that is, it has a lesser 
position than member states) and the EP [that is, the European Parliament] has no power 
(and little influence) over the common foreign and security policy.”23 The European 
Commission’s lack of authority over member states is also apparent in the fact that it 
holds a seat on the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) that is equal to the 
seats held by various EU member states.24 
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of the conflicting mandates of EU 
structures resides in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are sponsored by 
EU member states in Afghanistan. The PRTs suffer from the lack of an integrated 
strategy, even though the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is 
technically the lead for PRTs in Afghanistan. The EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration and 
the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan call for continued 
support of these PRTs—even with the challenges they face. According to the findings of 
a 2008 workshop organized by the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, 
“PRTs have become an integral part of peacekeeping and stability operations; but they 
have also been criticized for their mixed effectiveness, overemphasis on military 
objectives and priorities, failure to effectively coordinate and communicate with the UN 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and differences in staffing and mission.”25 
Moreover, the same workshop report notes that “Almost five years after the  
 
                                                 
22 Europa, Treaty on European Union, 30. 
23 Smith, Crowe, and Peterson, “International Interests,” 253. 
24 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) Terms of 
Reference,” http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/src/Information%20on%20JCMB/JCMB%20TOR%20-
%20English.pdf (accessed December 3, 2009). 1–2. 
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establishment of the first PRT, the extent to which they are meant to be a mechanism for 
development, security, COIN [counterinsurgency], or even a partnership between 
agencies on the ground is undefined.”26 
Indeed, the only way to ensure a coordinated EU development strategy in 
Afghanistan would be for the European Council, the combined heads of state and 
government of the member nations, to agree to a consolidated strategy. Considering the 
past history of the European Union’s heads of state and government balking at the 
erosion of their national sovereignty, this would be a difficult undertaking. Only a 
coherent strategy grounded in experience and reason might move the European Council 
to endorse a shift to a supranational EU development strategy in Afghanistan, which 
would have a chance to succeed.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis relies on a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources. Key 
primary sources include the EC Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan, the EU-
Afghanistan Joint Declaration, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and 
other documents relevant to the activities of the European Union in support of its 
development strategies in Afghanistan. Various assessments and reports are considered in 
order to reach informed judgments about the effectiveness of the EU’s current 
development strategy in Afghanistan. Published articles and official sources are used to 
describe and analyze the “Nangarhar Inc” and “super envoy” case studies. This thesis 
relies on a case study approach consistent with the methods outlined by Alexander 
George and Andrew Bennett in Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences.27 For the “super envoy” case study, examples of development coordination 
challenges are examined to determine whether a “super envoy” could successfully 
address these issues. Chapter IV examines the imbalance between EU donor short-term 
                                                 
25 Nima Abbaszadeh et al., Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations, 
Workshop Proceedings, Princeton, January 2008. 
http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf (accessed August 8, 2009). 4. 
26 Ibid., 14. 
27 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, Cambridge, Massachussets: The MIT Press, 2005. 
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and long-term projects, as well as the disconnect between the ANDS and the PDPs. An 
analysis of the “Nangarhar Inc” case study provides a practical template and theoretical 
basis for regional strategies that could bridge the ANDS/PDP gap, while correcting the 
existing imbalance in the EU donor strategies.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows. Following the introductory chapter, the 
analytical framework is established in Chapter II. This framework includes the Afghan 
National Development Strategy, as well as pertinent European Union development 
organizations and their stated objectives. Chapter III examines EU strategy and 
coordination challenges. It includes an analysis of two “super envoy” approaches that the 
EU could implement in order to make its development strategy in Afghanistan more 
effective. Chapter IV analyzes the “Nangarhar Inc” case study to determine how the EU 
could effectively use regional development strategies to generate sustainable economic 
growth in Afghanistan. Chapter V offers conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan28 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The reconstruction and development environment in Afghanistan is extremely 
complex. At least 49 nations are engaged in donor activities in Afghanistan on various 
scales, as well as numerous international organizations and hundreds of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).29 The spectrum of development activities pursued 
by these actors is impressively diverse, adding to the complexity of the environment. 
                                                 
28 United Nations, United Nations Cartographic Section – Afghanistan, http://www.un.org/Depts/-
Cartographic/map/profile/afghanis.pdf (accessed December 6, 2009). 
29 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Development Assistance Database Afghanistan, Donor Profiles.  
http://dadafghanistan.gov.af/ (accessed December 6, 2009); United States International Grantmaking. 
Council on Foundations, Country Information, Afghanistan, June 2009. http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/ 
afghanistan.asp (accessed November 20, 2009). This website lists the current number of registered NGOs 
in Afghanistan at 1,756, while some estimates put the number at over 2,000. 
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Further, all of these actors in Afghanistan are pursuing disparate development 
strategies. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), published in 2008, 
is the Afghan-created development plan. Yet, although most actors involved in 
development in Afghanistan ostensibly support this plan, their activities typically diverge 
according to their internal mandates.  
There are also challenges associated with donors simply following the tenets of 
the ANDS. The mechanisms designed to implement the ANDS do not, in general, support 
regional development plans that leverage resources across boundaries within 
Afghanistan. In addition, there are few effective methods of holistically coordinating 
donor strategies and plans. The UN-mandated agency for coordinating donor activities, 
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), suffers from a lack of 
support by donor agencies—a phenomenon that is examined in Chapter III. The high 
number of actors with disparate strategies and mandates, combined with a lack of 
effectiveness in donor coordination, results in reduced aid impact, project duplication, 
and project overlap.   
The European Union (EU) is no stranger to these challenges. Although the EU 
possesses supranational characteristics, it has been unsuccessful in creating a unified 
development strategy in Afghanistan that could synchronize EU donor activities in a 
manner that the member states of the EU might support. This was emphasized by the 
Council of the European Union in its March 16, 2009 statement that “the Council 
recognizes the importance of increasing the EU’s coherence and visibility including by 
working towards a single EU representation.”30 However, no plan has yet emerged to 
overcome this “lack of unity” challenge.  
This chapter examines the donor and development framework in Afghanistan in 
order to facilitate the analysis of two possibilities for the European Union to improve its 
development strategy—namely those of improving EU donor coordination, as well as 
                                                 
30 ReliefWeb, Council Conclusions of Afghanistan – 2932nd General Affairs Council Meeting, March 
16, 2009. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/FJTC-7Q7H67?OpenDocument (accessed 
December 8, 2009). 
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adopting regional development strategies that leverage potential economic value chains 
and complement the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.31 
B. AFGHANISTAN 
1. Development Framework in Afghanistan 
a. International Organizations 
Numerous international organizations (IOs) are engaged in development 
activities in Afghanistan. These include the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), 
the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations, and the World Bank (WB), among others.32 
However, while it is, in a sense, only one of the numerous United Nations programs in 
Afghanistan, UNAMA plays a special role. UNAMA’s mission, as the lead United 
Nations mandated agency in Afghanistan, is to “promote peace, stability and progress in 
Afghanistan by leading the efforts of the international community.”33 In addition to 
“development and humanitarian” activities, UNAMA is also engaged in “political 
affairs.” These comprise UNAMA’s dual areas of emphasis in Afghanistan.34 
Theoretically, UNAMA, led by the Special Representative to the United Nations 
Secretary General (SR-SG) for Afghanistan, is the agency designed to coordinate 
international civilian efforts in Afghanistan. In practice, however, the implementation of 
this concept has proved problematic. This issue is discussed in Chapter III.  
                                                 
31 “Regional strategy” is a term often used by nations active in this area of the world to refer to 
strategies that cross international boundaries. While strategies with international implications are relevant 
to portions of Chapter IV, in the context of this thesis, “regional strategies” will refer to geographically 
broad strategies that cross provincial boundaries within the international boundaries of Afghanistan.  Here, 
a “value chain” describes a collection of natural or other resources within a certain geographic area, which, 
if leveraged, will result in a combined economic or social return on investment that could be equal to more 
than the sum of the parts.  
32 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Development Assistance Database. 
33 United Nations, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, 
http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1748 (accessed November 20, 2009). Q3. 
34 United Nations, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Q9. 
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The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is also mandated by the United Nations. Its efforts 
in development are overshadowed by its primary role in the security line of effort. Yet, 
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that fall within the structure of ISAF have a 
role to play in development activities in Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that ten of the 
twenty-six PRTs in Afghanistan are funded and led by EU nations.35 Thus, a revision of 
the EU development strategy must also consider the interactions of specific EU member 
states with ISAF and possible explanations for their failure to coordinate.  
b. The Government of Afghanistan 
  
Figure 2. Unitary Structure of the Afghan Government36 
                                                 
35 ISAF, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), April 29, 2009. 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/prt/index.html (accessed December 6, 2009). 
36 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, 
http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&gid-=250 
(accessed December 6, 2009). 70, 94; International Monetary Fund, Islamic State of Afghanistan—Letter of 
Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 
March 24, 2004. http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2004/afg/01/ (accessed December 6, 2009); 
Supreme Court of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan, January 3, 2004. 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.af/PDFiles/constitution2004_english.pdf (accessed December 6, 2009). 
Chapter 1, Article 1; World Bank, Governance and Public Sector Management in South Asia, 2009. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EXTSAREGTOPPRIS
ECDEV/0,,contentMDK:20584869~menuPK:496677~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:496
671,00.html (accessed December 6, 2009); Wikipedia, Map of Unitary States, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_unitary_states.svg (accessed December 2009); after Mission 
Analysis Briefing, Forward Operating Base Fenty, July 3, 2008.  
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The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is a 
centrally controlled unitary government (see Figure 2) with a series of ministries that 
manage government activities. These national ministries maintain offices at the 
provincial level to implement their programs, but the composition of the district 
governments does not mirror that of the provincial and national levels (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Afghanistan Government—Ministry-Based Services37 
There are 26 ministries within the GIRoA,38 but only five Afghan 
ministries participate in the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB), the body led 
by UNAMA and the GIRoA to coordinate donor activities in Afghanistan. These five 
ministries are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
the Ministry of Economy (MoEc), the Ministry of Education (MoE), and the Ministry of 
                                                 
37 United States. Department of Defense, Nangarhar Inc Presentation, July 2008. Not all ministries are 
represented in this diagram. The district government shown is an example from within Nangarhar Province 
and is not representative of all districts in Afghanistan. There is no tashkeel, or authorization document, for 
a district government, as there is for the provincial level and above. 
38 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, “The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance, 7th 
Edition,” 2009. http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13& Itemid=17 
(accessed March 2, 2010). 79. 
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Justice (MoJ).39 The key ministries involved in donor and development activities include 
the Ministry of Finance, which manages the Afghan budget (including the portions that 
are generated from donor funds), and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development (MRRD), which implements many of the GIRoA reconstruction and 
development plans within the ANDS framework.  
Although the government of Afghanistan has complained that only a small 
percentage of international aid and donor funds is channeled through the GIRoA, this is 
due, in large part, to the fact that widespread corruption permeates the GIRoA.40 A 
further factor is the GIRoA’s lack of capability to effectively administer budgets and aid 
programs in many sectors. Corruption and lack of capacity in the GIRoA put UNAMA 
and aid donors in a difficult position. Many would like the GIRoA to determine and 
implement its own solutions—assisted by donor aid. The 2009 United Nations Report of 
the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan took note of some recent progress 
in this area. According to this report, the Afghan government has become more effective 
at planning and executing its development strategies and programs.41 However, until  
 
 
                                                 
39 Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) Terms of 
Reference, http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/src/Information%20on%20JCMB/JCMB%20TOR%20-
%20English.pdf (accessed December 6, 2009). 2. 
40 Center for the Study of The Presidency, “Afghanistan Study Group Report: Revitalizing Our 
Efforts, Rethinking Our Strategies,” Center for the Study of The Presidency and Congress. 
http://www.thepresidency.org/Publications/Afghanistan_Study_Group_Report.php (accessed November 
20, 2009). 5, 13, 28; European Commission, EU Blue Book 2009: The EU and Afghanistan, 
http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/downloadable_documents/EUBlueBookAfg_2009.pdf (accessed 
November 20, 2009). 38; NATO, “Afghanistan Report 2009,” (accessed November 30, 2009) 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_03/20090331_090331_afghanistan_report_2009.pdf  
5, 19, 21; United Nations, “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its 
Implications for International Peace and Security,” Afghanistan Conflict Monitor – Key Documents. 
September 22, 2009. http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/UNSC_S2009475.pdf (accessed November 20, 
2009). 2, 5–6, 17, 19; United Nations. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1868, March 23, 2009. 
4–5, 7; United States. Department of Defense, “Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 
January 2009. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf (accessed November 
20, 2009). 10–11, 20–25, 33, 45, 50, 52, 54, 58. 
41 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan,” 10; see also Matt 
Waldman, “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” ACBAR Advocacy Series. March 2008. 
http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness 
%20(25%20Mar%2008).pdf (accessed January 14, 2010). 3. Waldman notes “an incremental increase in 
government capacity, for example, in the ministries of Finance and Education.” 
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corruption declines, and the Afghan government’s capacity to effectively manage its own 
programs is established, donors will continue to be reluctant to channel funds through the 
GIRoA. 
2. Documents Governing the EU Relationship with Afghanistan 
a. Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
Since the Bonn Conference in 2001, Afghanistan’s development strategy 
has grown from infancy. With support from various international organizations in 
Afghanistan such as UNAMA, the World Bank, and the IMF, the GIRoA presented an 
Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) to donors at the London 
Conference in 2006. The final Afghanistan National Development Strategy for the period 
2008 to 2013, which was approved by the GIRoA in 2008, serves as the overarching 
Afghan development plan as well as the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP). It is designed to achieve its overall visions, to meet the UN Millennium 
Development Goals, and to qualify for funding from the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). The strategy within this 
comprehensive 266-page document encompasses three primary pillars: Security; 
Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights; and Economic and Social Development.42 
Within these primary pillars are eight sector pillars, which represent a wide variety of 
economic and social development programs: Security, Good Governance, Infrastructure 
and Natural Resources, Education and Culture, Health and Nutrition, Agriculture and 
Rural Development, Social Protection (such as women’s rights), and Economic 
Governance.43 Each of these sector pillars contains multiple sub-pillars, or subsections of 
emphasis (see Figure 4), making the ANDS a comprehensive but complicated 
development strategy.  
                                                 
42 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387–1391 (2008–
2013) A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction,” ANDS Documents. 
2008. http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/ands_docs/index.asp (accessed November 30, 2009). i, 5, 6. 
43 Ibid., 18.  
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Figure 4. ANDS Pillar Structure44 
The ANDS contains elements of a top-down development strategy, in that 
it is a holistic development strategy with long-term national goals. Yet its authors also 
considered input from bottom-up, sub-national consultations during its creation. This is in 
keeping with the recommendation by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) that development strategies in poor countries maintain a 
“judicious balance between top-down and bottom-up approaches.”45 Regardless of its 
efficacy, donors view it as a critical document because it represents the “Afghan 
                                                 
44 After Hamish Nixon, “Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding Paradox in 
Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. April 2007. 
http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=487 (accessed February 14, 
2010). 12; after International Monetary Fund, “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy: First Annual Report (2008/09),” November 2009. (accessed December 2, 2009). 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09319.pdf  15. The figure lists the three primary pillars (or 
goals), the eight sector pillars, 17 sub-pillars, and the five cross-cutting themes at the bottom. 
45 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “The DAC Guidelines: Strategies for 
Sustainable Development,” 2001. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/10/2669958.pdf (accessed November 
30, 2009). 41. 
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solution.”  This concept helps to explain why there is a consensus among donor countries 
and organizations (including EU donors) that the tenets of the ANDS must be supported 
when considering donor strategies.46 This idea has shaped the development strategies of 
many donors in Afghanistan.   
The ANDS incorporates Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) and 
District Development Plans (DDPs) as devices to achieve its overarching strategic vision. 
To assist in the formulation of these plans, the ANDS utilized a series of national and 
sub-national consultations in 2007. Each of the 16,753 Community Development 
Councils (CDCs) in Afghanistan submitted project “wish lists” to the 345 District 
Development Assemblies (DDAs) in Afghanistan. These are bodies established at the 
district level that consolidate projects into the DDPs.47 
The projects sent to the DDAs primarily concerned poverty reduction and 
the needs of communities (flood control projects, canals, etc).48 The DDAs identified the 
top projects in each of the eight sectors of the ANDS to create the DDPs. From these 
plans, the top ten projects in each sector were identified and prioritized to create the 
foundation for the 34 Provincial Development Plans.  
                                                 
46 European Commission, “EU Blue Book 2009,” 23; European Commission, “Country Strategy 
Paper: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007–2013,” Europa – External Relations. 
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http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/csp/mip_07_13_en.pdf (accessed December 6, 2009). 3–
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http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/documents/afgh_state_of_play_july_09.pdf  (accessed December 
6, 2009). 2; United Kingdom. House of Commons, International Development Committee – Fourth Report, 
February 14, 2008. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmintdev/65/6508.htm#a14 (accessed 
November 20, 2009). 7; United States. Department of Defense, “Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 12. 
47 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “The Provincial Development Plan of Province Nangarhar,” 
August 5–15, 2007. 9–10, cited in David Spencer, “Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Inc,” Military Review 89, no. 
4 (July–August 2009): 34. Portions of this chapter are based on this work by the author. See also, Sayed 
Mohammed Shah, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Formulation Process: Influencing 
Factors and Challenges,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. February 2009. 
http://www.areu.org.af/index .php?option=com_docman&Itemid=26&task=doc_download&gid=632. 
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22,104 as of 19 March 2009. European Commission, “Afghanistan: State of Play January 2010,” Europa. 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/ documents/state_of_play_afg_2010-jan.pdf (accessed February 
25, 2010). 5.  
48 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Provincial Development Plan of Nangarhar,” 39–44. 
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In principle, a prioritized list of 80 projects by province should be useful 
for donors to identify potential reconstruction and development projects. Yet, this 
method, which identifies the most pressing needs of the people at the local level, presents 
challenges in the development environment. First, it is not clear how ministerial strategies 
at the national level impact the PDPs in a meaningful way. Second, the PDPs assert that 
national development strategies were taken into account, but go on to note that the 
provinces had begun the construction of the PDPs before the launch of the sub-national 
consultations and the formulation of the ANDS. As a result, “the PDPs were not aligned 
with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the process was not 
linked to national level development planning processes.”49 This defines the critical 
challenge with the ANDS. In essence, the PDPs and DDPs consist of project wish lists 
generated by communities that did not possess a regional or national view of the 
development problem. To expect these lists of local poverty reduction projects to achieve 
the goals of a holistic, comprehensive, and long-term national strategy is unrealistic. This 
issue is central to an analysis of the challenges faced by donor agencies that simply 
follow the ANDS because it is the “Afghan solution.” 
b. International Agreements 
Although there were multiple international conferences on Afghanistan 
following the Bonn Conference in 2001 (see Figure 5), the 2006 London Conference was 
exceptionally important in that it marked the launch of the Afghanistan Compact, an 
agreement designed to synchronize donor activities and programs in Afghanistan for the 
following five years, with an expiry date of 2010. According to the Delegation of the 
European Commission to Afghanistan, “The Afghanistan Compact…sets out mutual 
commitments, [and] detailed benchmarks and timelines across four crucial areas: (1) 
security; (2) governance, rule of law and human rights; (3) economic and social 
                                                 
49 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Kunar Province Provincial Development Plan,” August 5–16, 
2007. 7–8; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Provincial Development Plan of Nangarhar,” 10; see also 
Shah, “Formulation Process,” 17–18. Shah notes that this process was rushed; only four months were given 
to complete the entire PDP consultation process due to a self-imposed GIRoA timeline.  
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development; and (4) counter-narcotics.”50 The Afghan Compact, along with the I-
ANDS, served as a guide to EU donors. The Compact did not significantly improve EU 
donor coordination, but rather provided a focus for EU donors to channel bilateral aid 
into certain areas.   
 
Figure 5. Key International Development Conferences for Afghanistan51 
c. UN Security Council Resolutions 
The preponderance of international intervention and activity in 
Afghanistan falls under the scope of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1386 (2001), authorizing the creation of the International Security Assistance 
                                                 
50 Delegation of the European Commission to Afghanistan, “Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner at the 
International Conference on Afghanistan: providing new impetus to EU's long-term commitment,” 
http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/downloadable_documents/Nov_2008/Press_Release/PR_30mar09.pdf 
(accessed December 2, 2009). 2. 
51 After European Commission, “Afghanistan: State of Play January 2009,” 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/documents/afgh_state_of_play_january_09_en.pdf  (accessed 
October 18, 2009). 1; European Commission, “State of Play: July 2009,” 2–3; United Kingdom. Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, Outcomes from Afghanistan: The London Conference, 2010. 
http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/ conference/outcomes/ (accessed February 19, 2010). In the table, $1=€1. 
Not covered are the July 2006 Tokyo Conference, the July 2007 Rome Conference, and The Hague 
Conference in March 2009. 
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Force (ISAF)52 under which the Provincial Reconstruction Teams operate, and UNSCR 
1401 (2002), providing for the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan.53 UNAMA’s mandate has been renewed annually since 2002, and it was 
extended through March 23, 2010 by UNSCR 1868 (2009).54  
d. EU Documents 
The European Union has a number of documents that provide a 
framework for overall EU civil activities in Afghanistan: the 2003 European Security 
Strategy; the 2005 EU-Afghanistan Joint Agreement; the updated European Commission 
Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Afghanistan, published in 2007; the Multi-annual 
Indicative Program (MIP), which covers the years 2007–2010, and various other 
documents. 
(1) European Security Strategy: Providing the Context. Published 
in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) provides a foundation for the European 
Union’s intervention in Afghanistan. The collapse of the state of Afghanistan under the 
“bad governance” of the Taliban is specifically noted in support of the EU’s desire to 
promote good governance in strategic regions. Another rationale for the EU’s 
engagement in Afghanistan is concern over the influx of drugs into the European Union. 
This concern is highlighted by the statement in the ESS that “90% of the heroin in Europe 
comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan.”55 The 2008 Report on the Implementation of 
the European Security Strategy further highlighted the relevance of Afghanistan to the 
EU’s security concerns, noting the ongoing efforts of the EU in governance and 
development in Afghanistan.56 
                                                 
52 United Nations. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386, 20 December 2001, 2. 
53 United Nations. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1401, 28 March 2002, 2. 
54 United Nations. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1868, 23 March 2009, 4. 
55 Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security 
Strategy,” Consilium – European Security Strategy. December 12, 2003. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=en (accessed March 2, 2010). 4, 5.  
56 Council of the European Union, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – 
Providing Security in a Changing World,” Consilium – European Security Strategy. December 12, 2008. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=en (accessed March 2, 2010). 7. 
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(2) EU-Afghanistan Joint Agreement: Defining the Relationship. 
On November 16, 2005, the Council of the European Union published an EU-
Afghanistan Joint Declaration detailing the plan for cooperation by these two actors in 
the coming years. The agreement, while considering the EU as a whole, also notes the 
contributions by the EU member states in Afghanistan but stops short of assigning 
specific tasks.57 This seven-page document builds upon the international conferences 
dedicated to Afghanistan since 2001 (see Figure 5). The agreement states that the 
Afghans will continue to pursue various programs that the EU views as important (see 
Figure 6).”58  
According to the agreement, the European Union has agreed to 
provide assistance in various fields, including technical assistance for economic 
cooperation, police forces, the justice sector, counter narcotics, poverty reduction, the 
Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals, human rights, civil society, education and 
culture, and refugee return. The agreement also establishes a formal political dialogue 
with annual meetings between the key leaders of the two actors.59 
                                                 
57 Council of the European Union, EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration: Committing to a New EU-
Afghan Partnership Strasbourg, European Union: External Relations. November 16, 2005. 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14519.en05.pdf (accessed December 2, 2009). 2.   
58 Council of the European Union, EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration, 2.  
59 Ibid., 3–7. 
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Figure 6. Key Points in the 2005 EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration60 
Although the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration is largely 
symbolic in nature (in that it merely reaffirms many of the tenets established in the 
Afghanistan Compact), it is important in that it initiates a formal relationship between 
these two actors, with an identified set of agreements to shape their relationship in the 
future. An interesting characteristic of the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration is that it 
defines an extremely broad scope of possible EU engagement. This broad scope may 
have been necessary in the early years of the first CSP, but the EU has opportunities to 
leverage focused, large-scale projects that could achieve great effects in the current, more 
mature, development environment in Afghanistan.  
(3) Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan: Outlining the 
Strategy. The Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan is a document published by the 
European Commission that outlines the overall EU development strategy in Afghanistan. 
The first CSP for Afghanistan was published in 2003 and provided an EU strategy for the 
period 2003–2006. It focused on reconstituting and rebuilding the infrastructure required 
                                                 
60 Council of the European Union, “EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration,” 1–7. 
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to provide basic services to Afghans, as well as supporting the establishment of the 
fledging GIRoA.61 Published in 2007, the current CSP encompasses the following six 
years (until 2013), and addresses mid to long-term needs in Afghanistan with the goal of 
assisting the GIRoA to become more self-sufficient.62 The CSP has its foundations in 
“Article 177 of the Treaty of the European Union,” which promotes poverty reduction 
and “sustainable economic and social development” in developing countries.63 The CSP 
also takes note of the “2001 Communication Europe and Asia (Commission Commu-
nication COM(2001)469 ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for enhanced 
partnerships’),” which defines broad parameters for EU engagement in Asia, including 
development goals similar to those outlined in the Treaty of the European Union.64 
Because of the extensive needs of Afghan society, the European 
Commission engaged in a wide range of sectors and projects during the initial phases of 
the 2003–2006 CSP.65 The current CSP provides a more focused framework for EU 
development in Afghanistan in that it identifies the efforts by other non-EU key donors in 
Afghanistan, and their areas of emphasis, as well as the donor activities of the EU 
member states. This allows the EC to focus and prioritize its development strategy, while 
accounting for the other ongoing donor efforts and “ensuring it supports those sectors 
where the EC has a clear value added and where there is a lack of other major donors.”66 
Finally, the CSP synthesizes the EU’s relevant core documents, the capabilities of the 
EC, the Millennium Development Goals, and the ANDS into a development strategy for 
the European Union. Although the CSP was prepared while the interim ANDS was still 
in draft form, the EC drew its CSP priorities from the drafters of the ANDS to ensure that 
the two strategies would be dovetailed.67  
                                                 
61 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper,” 3. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Europa, Treaty on European Union, http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/ 
11992M.html#0001000001 (accessed December 6, 2009), cited in European Commission, “Country 
Strategy Paper,” 30. The CSP also refers to Article 130u in the Treaty on European Union. 
64 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper,” 30.  
65 Ibid., 15.  
66 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper,” 18. 
67 Ibid., 4, 19. 
 28
(4) Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP): Providing Resolu-
tion to the Development Strategy. According to the Delegation of the European 
Commission to Afghanistan, “The overall objective of the Multi-annual National 
Indicative Programme is to support the sustainable reduction of poverty in Afghanistan 
within the framework of the interim-Afghanistan National Development Strategy (i-
ANDS).”68 However, the MIP is basically a focused plan for the implementation of the 
CSP in the years 2007–2010. The CSP outlines three focal and non-focal areas for the EC 
in Afghanistan: rural development, government, and health—and social protection, 
demining activities, and regional cooperation, respectively.69 The MIP identifies how the 
EC will pursue those goals with the €700 million EU budget pledged for the period 
2007–2010 for that purpose.70 Because the current and follow-on MIP have three-year 
timespans, the Commission develops an “Annual Action Programme (AAP) for 
Afghanistan, with several sectoral actions/projects, in line with the MIP,” allowing the 
EC to further refine its plan in light of recent developments.71 A new MIP is scheduled 
for publication in 2010, based on a mid-term review of the CSP. This new MIP will 
include inputs from “local authorities and civil society as well as Member States and 
other key donors, and will be subject to the democratic scrutiny of the European 
Parliament.”72 The MIP updated areas of emphasis for the EC are not yet available, but 
the new MIP may benefit from more development opportunities for the EC in light of the 
October 27, 2009 statement of the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner, in that she proposed to “substantially increase the annual amount of 
Commission assistance for the next financial perspective 2011—2013.”73 
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(5) Other Documents: The Foundations of EU Development. The 
European Commission has cited a 2001 EC Communication titled Europe and Asia: A 
Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, which provides a “strategic 
framework” for EU activities in Asia. The European Security Strategy echoes many of 
the objectives within this document.74 On December 18, 2006, the European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union enacted Regulation 1905 “establishing a 
financing instrument for development cooperation.” The regulation established a 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) to streamline EU development activities. It 
also outlined funding for countries identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This 
regulation identified the Millennium Development Goals and the “European Consensus” 
as documents providing the context for EU development objectives. It listed “poverty 
reduction, [and] sustainable economic and social development” as key objectives within 
the regulation.75 The European Consensus is a shared vision, approved on December 20, 
2005, which declared that the EU’s “chief objective is to reduce poverty worldwide in the 
context of sustainable development.”76 The EU’s agreement in this area is defined in the 
May 2001 EU agreement, “Strategy for Sustainable Development.”77 
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There are some notable challenges with the key documents that 
provide a basis for EU development activities in Afghanistan. First, although the Council 
of the European Union has published numerous policy statements, it is clear that the 
Commission is the primary driver for supranational EU donor activity in Afghanistan. 
Second, the CSP and the MIP were written primarily by, as well as for, the European 
Commission. Although the member states of the EU were consulted throughout the 
drafting of these documents, and the EC clearly meant the documents to provide holistic 
development guidance for overall EU activities, there are no binding commitments for 
EU member states. In other words, nothing compels the member states to follow any 
portion of the CSP. In formulating the EC strategy, the authors of the CSP take into 
account the programs and areas of emphasis of the EU member states as well as other 
donor activities, but the EU member states do not define their plans in light of the EC’s 
CSP. Additionally, although the EC has identified the pursuit of mid to long-term goals, 
as well as the goal of pursuing “sustainable development,” in the 2007 CSP, the identified 
EC projects and activities did not reflect these themes. Finally, the CSP identifies specific 
geographic and sectoral areas on which to focus in Afghanistan, according to the ANDS, 
but it does not provide the framework necessary to pursue regional strategies in order to 
leverage economic value chains—a capability provided by the EC’s relatively large 
donor budget. This challenge is examined further in Chapters III and IV.  
C. EUROPEAN UNION 
The European Union has a variety of compelling objectives that drive its 
intervention in Afghanistan. The International Crisis Group stated in 2005 that “The EU 
role in rebuilding Afghanistan is not about altruism,”78 and, indeed, its key documents 
outline Realpolitik EU ambitions. Both domestically, and in keeping with its aspirations 
as a global player, the European Union has a number of security and economic concerns 
in Afghanistan. The EU’s development objectives aim to support its broader goals of 
preventing state failure by promoting good governance, improving regional stability, and 
                                                 
78 International Crisis Group, “Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union's Role (Asia Report 
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reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the European Union.79 This interpretation is 
consistent with the statement from the Council of the European Union that “terrorism and 
militant extremism, illegal drugs, transnational crime and weapons of mass destruction” 
are current threats to the EU that originate in Afghanistan and Pakistan.80 Another motive 
of EU member states, particularly those who are also members of NATO, has been to 
demonstrate solidarity with the United States.81 The core EU documents that outline EU 
engagement in Afghanistan clearly identify the importance of this region of the world to 
the EU. The following section examines the activities of the EU donors to determine their 
characteristics, scope, and efficacy. EU donor coordination is also analyzed in light of its 
importance in contributing to the stated objectives of the European Union in Afghanistan. 
1. Scope of EU Development Involvement in Afghanistan  
Currently, 25 of the 27 member states of the European Union are engaged in 
donor activities in Afghanistan. The only exceptions are Cyprus and Malta. In addition to 
the member states, the European Commission is actively engaged in various recon-
struction and development programs in Afghanistan. In purely monetary terms, the 
institutions of the European Union have contributed one-fourth of the total EU donor aid 
to Afghanistan, with the remainder covered by the direct, bilateral aid of the EU member 
states.82 In this light, it is evident that the “European Union” (in the sense of the 
collective institutions, above all the Commission) is only able to influence a fraction of 
the total EU donor aid to Afghanistan. The European Union delegation at the United 
Nations states that “Between 2002 and 30 June 2009 the Commission's support to 
Afghanistan amounted to €1.65 billion including €282 million in humanitarian assistance. 
By the end of June 2009 the EC had disbursed €1.398 billion, i.e. a successful 
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disbursement rate of 84.7%” of what had been planned for that period.83 The EC and the 
EU member states combined have committed “around EUR 8 billion for the period 2002–
2010,”84 making the EU donors collectively the second largest aid contributor in 
Afghanistan.85 
Together with the European Commission, the funds provided by the United 
Kingdom and Germany account for 57% of total EU aid per year, and the next seven 
largest EU member nations account for another 36% of the EU aid to Afghanistan. These 
nations are the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, France, Finland, and Spain, in 
order of their relative contributions.86 Besides the programs identified in the CSP, the 
MIP, and the AAPs, additional EU activities that impact Afghanistan include Asian EC 
programs such as “Aid for Uprooted People,” thematic programs such as “Food 
Security,” and other EU global or Asia-based programs.87 The European Commission’s 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) continues to provide humanitarian assistance in 
Afghanistan.88 Many EU member states are also pursuing bilateral national aid programs 
in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Asia, suggesting that the lack of unity on the part of the 
EU donors in Afghanistan is representative of a larger problem in the coordination of 
overall EU foreign policy.  
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Besides development agencies and NGOs, EU member states fund and lead ten of 
the PRTs active in Afghanistan. Although European Union development agencies operate 
throughout Afghanistan, and the EC is active in every province but one (Paktika), the ten 
EU-led PRTs operate primarily in RC-North, West, and South.89 The Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK all lead 
PRTs in the north, west and south of Afghanistan, with non-EU NATO countries Canada, 
Norway, Turkey, and the United States leading nearly all the remainder.90  
EU-led PRTs contribute to the lack of EU donor coordination in Afghanistan. 
According to a study prepared by three research institutes, “no attempt has been made to 
harmonise the activities of the PRTs in Afghanistan or those under the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), beyond the overall common objectives of contributing 
to stability, security, and the effective outreach of government authority in the provinces 
concerned.”91 There is no standard structure for the PRTs, including those led by EU 
member states. There are only two loosely defined models: a UK model of about 100 
personnel led by a civilian, with around 70 military personnel and 30 civilians on the 
team, and a German model of about 400 personnel co-led by a civilian and a military 
officer with only about 20 civilians. The UK model stresses local capacity building, 
whereas the German model emphasizes long-term sustainable development.92 However, 
even within these models, the lead nations determine which development activities they 
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desire to support and fund. The fact that the PRTs led by EU member states fall under the 
NATO-led ISAF only highlights the need for the EU to define a unified development 
strategy in coordination with ISAF.   
EUPOL Afghanistan is an EU mission with the purpose of “contribut[ing] to the 
establishment of sustainable and effective civil policing arrangements…under Afghan 
ownership.”93 As of March 2009, 19 EU member states had contributed 225 international 
staff personnel in support of this rule of law sector mission.94 Although this European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) mission is not directly involved in reconstruction, it 
falls within the “Good Governance and Rule of Law” sector pillar of the ANDS, and is 
thus complementary to the EU development efforts in Afghanistan. Giji Gya and Olivier 
Jacquemet note, however, that the mission has suffered from lack of coordination within 
the EU, as well as between the EU and NATO—preventing the use of PRT assets to 
protect the mission since “leading countries of some PRTs argue that EUPOL does not 
fall under the Berlin Plus agreements.”95 Judy Dempsey of the New York Times has 
reported further difficulties with the statement that the mission “is understaffed, lacks 
adequate security and transportation, and has yet to develop a uniform training 
program.”96 Piotr Krawcyzk, a member of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, 
has stated that “There is [a] complete lack of coordination between the E.U. institutions 
in Afghanistan and between the other big players, including the United Nations and 
NATO.”97 Clearly, the European Union’s development challenges in Afghanistan extend 
to the EUPOL mission as well. 
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2. Donor Fund Flow from the EU to Afghanistan 
EU donor funds for Afghanistan reconstruction and development derive from two 
primary sources: the individual member states on a bilateral basis with Afghanistan, and 
the European Commission through the EU budget, to which EU member states 
contribute. The EU member states provide bilateral donor funds from their national 
budgets, and the allocations and priorities are determined in large part on a bilateral basis. 
The European Commission, in contrast, proposes the amount of supranational funds for 
allocation to Afghanistan based on its priorities, and the European Parliament and the 
European Council determine the final spending plan.98 For the European Parliament (EP), 
budget approval remains the primary method of oversight for EU activities in 
Afghanistan.  
The final amount determined annually for Afghanistan is applied to the priorities 
set forth in the European Commission’s CSP and MIP. However, since those documents 
have a six and three-year scope respectively, the European Commission has “shifted from 
individual project proposals to strategic Annual Action Programmes (AAP) prepared in 
consultation with the Afghan government and stakeholders."99 These Annual Action 
Programmes outline the detailed focus for the EU that annum and further define specific 
objectives, funding allocations, and plans for execution, within the defined sectors, from 
the most current information on the situation in Afghanistan. The EU has also pledged 
blocks of additional funding for specific spending requirements in Afghanistan, such as 
the €700 million allocated for the implementation of the MIP for the period 2007–2010, 
and an additional €60 million to support the national elections in Afghanistan in 2009.100 
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Donor funds flow from the European Union to Afghanistan in a number of ways. 
Dividing the funding flow into two categories, funds originating from EU member states 
and funds from the supranational European Commission, is too simple a description to be 
accurate. The dynamics of the EU funding flows are complex.  
a. EU Funding Flows 
Ideally, EU donor funds would be channeled through organizations that 
fall under the purview of UNAMA and the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board 
(JCMB), the international body set up to accomplish this coordination. In principle, these 
actors have the ability to facilitate the coordination of donor projects and funds. 
However, the EC and EU member states have other options available to channel funds, 
including development agencies, NGOs, and private contractors that fall outside of the 
purview of UNAMA and the JCMB. Although theoretically the tenets of the ANDS 
should guide all EU donor activity in Afghanistan, in reality these various methods of 
channeling funds, combined with the disparate mandates and objectives of the EU 
donors, lead to project overlap, project duplication, and general aid ineffectiveness.  
 
Figure 7. Donor Funding Flow from the EU to Afghanistan 
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b. European Commission  
The Country Strategy Paper on Afghanistan describes the European 
Commission’s funding mechanisms as follows: 
To date, the European Commission has channeled funds through a number 
of means. It has directly funded private contractors and NGOs, as well as 
channeled funds through the framework of the National Development 
Budget, and through the multilateral trust funds established to support the 
government’s recurrent budget and the National Priority Programmes. For 
the medium term, multilateral trust funds may continue to be a necessary 
vehicle for channeling substantial budgetary support.101 
Multilateral trust funds are a common vehicle for EU donors to channel 
aid into Afghanistan, even though the ANDS identifies the Afghan central government as 
the preferred funding mechanism, with the goal of “75 % of aid to be channeled through 
the core budget.”102 Examples of multilateral trust funds include the Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 
(LOTFA), and the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF), with the ARTF and LOTFA 
comprising 40% of the Afghan government’s core budget in 2007–2008.103 According to 
a 2009 European Union Council Secretariat Factsheet, the European Union is the largest 
contributor to the LOTFA fund, which supports the operational costs of the Afghan 
National Police force.104 These trust funds tend to be a preferred vehicle for the EC and 
EU member states to distribute aid and development funds in Afghanistan due to the still 
fledgling capacity of the GIRoA to administer large budgets, as well as the corruption 
that continues to pervade the Afghan government.  
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c. EU Member States 
A 2005 joint EU development agency evaluation on Afghanistan 
determined that the EU member states relied heavily on NGOs in the early years of 
intervention after the 2001 Bonn Conference. This was due primarily to the extensive 
experience in Afghanistan of the EU member state NGOs. The report stated, for example, 
that “Ireland chose to channel much of its aid through Irish NGOs, Sweden used the 
Swedish Afghanistan Committee as an important channel for aid provision and Denmark 
gave its NGOs significant support.”105 In effect, the capabilities of these NGOs shaped 
EU reconstruction and development activities in the early years—for both the EC and EU 
member states. An additional effect of this phenomenon is that the EU was forced to 
engage in a large number of small-scale projects, in the initial phases, that were designed 
to alleviate the crushing poverty of the Afghans. However, although the development 
environment has matured in Afghanistan, the EU has not significantly adjusted its 
strategy to encompass the pursuit of potential value chains that could create significant 
effects in the mid- and long-term. While trying to consolidate funds between the EU 
member states for large-scale projects is problematic (although not impossible), the 
European Commission has the ability to address large-scale projects beyond the 
capability of many national donors, but to date has not done so in earnest. This topic is 
further examined in Chapter IV.  
Currently, 25 EU member states are contributing donor funds for 
reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. The contributions range from an 
estimated annual high by the United Kingdom of €214.1 million to a low of €200,000 by 
Romania. The ANDS sectors that currently enjoy the most support by EU member states 
are Security; Agriculture and Rural Development; and Governance, Rule of Law and 
Human Rights. Unpreferenced contributions to the ARTF account for an estimated 
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annual €163.1 million, surpassing member state funding for all individual ANDS sectors, 
and highlighting the EU member state preference for this funding mechanism.106 
Figure 8 shows the geographical distribution of donor funds in 2001–2009 
by the top six member state aid contributors to Afghanistan: Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This data shows that EU member 
states have been active in every province of Afghanistan. The geographic dispersion is 
due to a number of factors such as national priorities, security levels, locations of PRTs, 
areas of expertise of NGOs and contractors, and ANDS sector requirements, among 
others. 
 
Figure 8. Geographic Distribution of Funds Committed (USD): Six Highest 
Contributing EU Member States. 2001–2009107 
As contributions to trust funds (such as the ARTF) and to NGOs tend to be 
used for short-term poverty reduction projects, an analysis of the EU member states’ 
preference for these funding channels could provide an indication of the overall level of 
coordination between EU donors. As shown in Figure 9, five EU member states 
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contributed 45% of their donor funds through these channels. This implies that EU 
donors are unwilling to pursue a unified strategy that could harness the potential of large-
scale projects. 
The United Nations Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief 
(ACBAR), provided figures for the contributions of five EU donor states from 2001–
2004. A comparison of these figures with the total donor contributions in Afghanistan 
appears to confirm that there has been an EU member state preference for utilizing NGOs 
and trust funds, such as the ARTF, to implement development projects, as well as a 
widespread aversion to channeling funds through the GIRoA. This pattern was especially 
prominent in the early years of the intervention in Afghanistan (see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Comparison of Select EU Member State Donor Contributions to Total 
Donor Contributions in Afghanistan in 2001–2004108 
A December 2004 study entitled “Aid Flows to Afghanistan” provides a 
useful glimpse into the preferred funding mechanisms by five EU member state donors in 
the early years of the international intervention. The report shows a tendency toward 
channeling “unpreferenced” funding through international organizations and trust funds, 
as opposed to EU donor coordination for focused projects (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Select EU Member State Disbursement Mechanisms, 2001–2004109 
This fact, together with the other indicators of preference (notably the 
reliance on NGOs), illustrates a general unwillingness of the EU donors to combine their 
donor efforts in a manner that could support large-scale projects with long-term benefits. 
As previously noted, positive experience with NGOs was a significant factor in the 
decision by EU member states to rely on NGOs for channeling funds in the early years of 
the intervention. However, a shift from this reliance, combined with a considered 
reallocation of trust fund contributions, could be one of the most important factors in 
allowing the EU donors to effectively contribute to sustainable development in 
Afghanistan in the mid to long-term.  
Adding to the complexity of the EU donor environment, EU member 
states use different funding mechanisms to support their individual development 
programs. EU member states have not used a “standard” method to channel funds, as 
Figure 11 illustrates. 
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Figure 11. Top 12 Fund Recipients for Five EU Member State Donors 2001–2005110 
In the same vein, since the GIRoA ministries have varying capacities to 
distribute funds and implement programs, the EU member states generally choose 
separate funding mechanisms for different ANDS sector pillars. For example, in 2001–
2005, EU member state donors preferred UN agencies and NGOs in the education and 
health sectors and avoided the GIRoA, while contributions to the National Solidarity 
Program (NSP), an internationally acclaimed GIRoA grassroots reconstruction program, 
were made primarily through the Afghan central government and multilateral trust funds 
such as the ARTF.111 These trends highlight the inability or unwillingness of the EU 
donors to coordinate their activities with each other. 
d. Multilateral Funding Mechanisms  
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) serves as a pertinent 
example of multilateral funding mechanisms. On July 22, 2002, the ARTF replaced the 
Afghan Interim Authority Fund (AIAF). The ARTF is administered by the World Bank 
and is the “leading multi-donor funding mechanism” in Afghanistan. It provides funding 
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for the operation of the Afghan government, finances reconstruction and development 
projects, and funds a number of GIRoA programs such as the National Solidarity 
Program, National Rural Access Program (NRAP), and the Microfinance Program. 
Thirteen EU member states, as well as the European Commission, use the ARTF to 
channel funds to various development and reconstruction programs, or simply employ it 
as an unpreferred donor contribution vehicle.112 According to Rhoda Margesson, 
“Recently, donors agreed to extend the ARTF until 2020. In part this reflects an ongoing 
commitment by donors to utilize the ARTF mechanism, and in part it is an 
acknowledgement of the development challenges that remain in Afghanistan.”113 This 
statement underscores the reason why donors continue to prefer the use of multilateral 
trust funds such as the ARTF instead of transferring funds directly to the GIRoA. 
However, “unpreferenced” ARTF contributions represent a possible source for the EU 
donors to redirect funds toward larger-scale projects that are beyond the capabilities of 
smaller donors. 
3. The Structure of the European Union: Effects on EU Donors in 
Afghanistan 
a. The European Union’s Policy Challenges: Supranational 
Aspects 
The European Union’s coordination challenges in Afghanistan are 
representative of its wider difficulties in the foreign policy arena. According to John 
McCormick, a professor of political science at Indiana Purdue University Purdue 
Indianapolis (IPUPI), the EU has been able to develop common strategies and positions 
for external challenges in the past (e.g., the Middle East and the Balkans), but this has not 
always ensured successful outcomes. He states that the EU’s disagreements on 
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international problems occur “in part from a lack of policy focus and leadership…and in 
part from policy differences among the governments of the member states.”114 
The structure of the European Union itself provides some explanation. 
McCormick has noted that “for many years there was no one in the EU institutions who 
could act as an authoritative focal point for discussions with other countries.” Moreover, 
the twice yearly turnover in the presidency of the European Council contributed to a lack 
of focus in EU foreign policy.115 Andrew Glencross, a professor of international relations 
at the University of Pennsylvania, stated that “This rotating presidency not only meant an 
absence of longer-term coordination but also hampered the efficient representation of EU 
interests abroad.”116 It remains to be seen if the 2½-year appointment of the President of 
the European Council, as provided by the Lisbon Treaty, will address European Union 
policy coordination challenges. 
The European Union has historically suffered from a lack of coordination 
among the EU institutions, notably in the area of foreign policy. There are a number of 
reasons for this. For example, although the European Council sets the policy direction for 
the EU, the Commission has represented the EU abroad—providing it significant 
influence over foreign policy decisions. According to Fiona Hayes-Renshaw, a professor 
at the College of Europe, Bruges, “The result of this fluidity and complexity is a tricky 
division of labor, necessitating constant liaison between the Commission, on the one 
hand, and the Council Secretariat and Presidency on the other.”117 This friction has been 
manifest in Afghanistan as well, causing Giji Gya and Olivier Jaquemet to reiterate the 
“ad nauseum critique of lack of coordination between” the European Commission and the 
European Council.118  
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(1) Role of the Council of the European Union in Afghanistan. The 
Council of the European Union plays various roles in EU-Afghan relations in accordance 
with its role in setting the policy agenda for the European Union. For example, the 
Council is involved in the negotiation and approval of such documents as the EU-
Afghanistan Joint Declaration in 2005 as well as various policy statements regarding 
Afghanistan. The European Council also publishes periodic statements, factsheets, and 
updates concerning the relationship between the EU and Afghanistan. The Council’s 
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) has reaffirmed the European 
Union’s “strong, long-term commitment to Afghanistan, as expressed by the European 
Council on 14 December 2006,” on multiple occasions.119  
The Office of the European Union Special Representative for 
Afghanistan (EUSRA) has historically operated within the purview of the Council of the 
European Union. The EUSRA holds a key position in the implementation of the EU 
development strategy in Afghanistan. According to the EUSRA Website, the “main focus 
of the work of the EUSRA is on the implementation of the Bonn Agreement.”120 The 
EUSRA serves as the EU point of contact for the GIRoA in Kabul and “advises the EU 
on its Afghanistan policy and on the implementation of its priorities for action.”121 In 
2009, this position was expanded in scope to encompass relations with Pakistan,122 
perhaps in response to the appointment by numerous nations of special envoys to both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.123 
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(2) Role of the European Commission in Afghanistan. The 
European Commission is the most active EU institution in Afghanistan. Its involvement 
began in the 1980s with an office in western Pakistan. The EC opened its office in Kabul 
in February 2002 to begin coordinating EC aid implementation.124 The EC has authored 
nearly all of the key documents that define the mechanics of the EU development 
programs with Afghanistan, including the Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan, the 
Multi-annual Indicative Programme and its predecessors, Annual Action Programmes, 
periodic “State of Play” reports, and the “Blue Book” on the EU and Afghanistan, which 
is intended to streamline donor approaches.125   
Previously, the EU’s relations with Afghanistan fell under the 
purview of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, as the EU External Affairs Commissioner. Her office 
managed the operations of EuropeAid, which oversees the EC’s development and 
humanitarian activities worldwide.126 Ferrero-Waldner’s position was replaced by that of 
the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
Catherine Ashton was selected on November 19, 2009 to fill the new post and took office 
on December 1, 2009.127 The head of the European Union Delegation to Afghanistan 
(under the Commission until the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty) was Hansjörg 
Kretschmer,128 who led the delegation responsible for the execution of the overall EU 
development strategy in Afghanistan. This position is to be merged with that of the 
EUSRA, which could aid in EU aid coordination by reducing the friction between the 
Council and the Commission.   
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As one of the six largest aid donors, the European Commission 
holds a seat on the JCMB—which is supposed to serve as a key mechanism for EU donor 
coordination. The EC is also active in the JCMB Consultative Groups and Working 
Groups. As noted by an EC “State of Play” report, the EC also “has an important role in 
intra-EU donor coordination through monthly meetings of the Development 
Counsellors.”129 Similarly, the European Commission’s 2008 Annual Action Programme 
notes that “[f]ormal EU heads of development meetings are held monthly in Kabul with 
Member States.”130 Finally, the Country Strategy Paper indicates that the EC consults 
closely with the member states in its activities. This is indicative of the important role 
played by the EU member states in Afghanistan. 
(3) Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s Engagement in 
Afghanistan. The Lisbon Treaty contains provisions designed to reduce discord among 
EU institutions and address pillar coordination issues. Derek Mix, an analyst for 
European Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, notes that Catherine Ashton’s 
new position as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (or “EU 
Foreign Minister”) will act as both “an agent of the Council of Ministers and a Vice-
President of the European Commission.”131  
In Afghanistan, the Lisbon Treaty could potentially further reduce 
the divide between the Council and the Commission. A critical example is the recent 
merging of the positions of the EUSRA and the head of the European Union’s delegation 
in Kabul into a single “double-hatted” position. On February 22, 2010, Catherine Ashton 
announced her choice for the position: Vygaudas Ušackas, who resigned his position as 
Lithuanian foreign minister in January 2010.132 By combining the recently expanded 
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Council position of the EUSRA133 with the European Commission’s head of delegation 
position, this appointment has significant potential to address the discord among EU 
institutions that has contributed to lack of coordination in Afghanistan. It remains to be 
seen how this position will affect the historical differences between the Council and the 
Commission over which institution will provide the lead role in an international 
engagement.134 
Finally, Mix holds that the Commission’s external delegations 
worldwide now reflect a common European Union identity. Since they are slated to be 
staffed by the External Action Service (recently created under Ashton) with “a mixture of 
personnel from the commission and the council,” the lines between the Commission and 
the Council in Afghanistan will become further blurred, which could contribute to unity 
of action.135 
Although Mix notes that EU development aid policies have 
supranational characteristics that should allow for unity of action under Ashton and the 
new EUSRA, politically charged foreign policy decisions will still “remain subject to 
national vetos.”136 Considering the reluctance of the EU member states to relinquish their 
authority in foreign policy decisions, even within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty,137 
it is difficult to determine exactly what impact this treaty will have on EU donor 
coordination in Afghanistan. 
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b. EU Member States  
The relationship between the EU member states and the institutions of the 
EU is central to the coordination challenges regarding the EU’s development strategy in 
Afghanistan. Liesbet Hooghe and Neill Nugent, professors at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill and Manchester Metropolitan University respectively, have 
pointed out that, as the EU’s “principal international actor,” the European Commission 
“shares responsibilities with member states in foreign policy, [and] development 
policy.”138 Helen Wallace, a prominent British expert on European affairs, has added that 
“there is no clear hierarchy which makes the EU either superior to or subordinate to its 
member states.”139 This sharing of responsibility is highlighted in Afghanistan, where the 
EC and the EU member states both play large roles in defining the EU engagement. Of 
course, this sharing of responsibility comes at a cost—that of diminished unity of action.  
Jo Coelmont states that in the early years of the international intervention 
in Afghanistan, the EU member states “set an upper and lower limit for their respective 
contributions, which differ widely, but are all based on the same premise of doing ‘the 
minimum necessary’ to maintain ‘good relations’ with the US.”140 To what extent this is 
true is unclear, but the current activities of the EU member states are clearly disparate. As 
previously noted, the capabilities of the EU member states are unequal, a factor that 
drives the types of programs in which they choose to engage. For example, as part of the 
lead donor nation concept, various EU donors have assumed responsibility for specific 
dimensions of Security Sector Reform (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. EU Lead Donors – Security Sector Reform141 
The primary objective of the Swedish program in Afghanistan is poverty 
reduction.142 Belgium is focused on reconstruction, with large portions of its funding 
channeled to the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development’s (MRRD) National 
Area-Based Development Program (NABDP) as well as to the National Solidarity 
Program. Germany engages in a wide variety of programs across the spectrum of the 
ANDS pillars. “Ireland’s aid…has traditionally focused on both humanitarian and 
development needs.” Finland focuses on two of the eight ANDS pillars: “Governance, 
rule of law and human rights” and “Rural Development and Agriculture.” Spain has 
identified the province of Badghis as the target of its main efforts, whereas Hungary has 
chosen Badglan province as its focus.143 These examples illustrate the wide variety of 
development activities in which the EU member states are engaging. 
c. EU-Afghan Coordination Structures 
Prior to the establishment of the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board in 
2006, EU donor coordination was conducted via informal working groups. The establish-
                                                 
141 After Peace Operations Monitor, “UNAMA Organization Chart,” http://pom/peacebuild.ca/ 
AfghanistanGovernance.html, cited in Kellie McCoy J., “Creating Effective Post-Conflict Transition 
Organizations: Lessons from Panama, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq,” (Thesis, U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, June 2008.) 71.  
142 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, “Afghanistan Sida Country Report 
2005,” http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/Sidas-Publications/ (accessed November 20, 2009). 9.  
143 European Commission, “EU Blue Book 2009,” 14, 20, 22, 28, 36. 
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ment of the JCMB created a formal structure with a 5-year mandate (2006–2011), within 
which EU donor activity can be coordinated with that of other donors in Afghanistan. 
The JCMB, which meets quarterly at whatever venue is deemed appropriate (to date, 
meetings have been held in Kabul, Berlin, and Tokyo), is co-chaired by the UNAMA SR-
SG and the Senior Economic Advisor to the President of Afghanistan. Twenty-eight 
members hold seats on the JCMB, of which seven are reserved for Afghan government 
officials. The remainder of the seats are for international actors based on certain criteria 
such as the “six largest development assistance contributors,” the top four troop-
contributing nations, neighboring and regional countries, and international organizations 
and financial institutions. Currently, the EC, Germany, and the UK maintain seats as 
three of the six largest aid contributors, while France, Italy, and the Netherlands owe their 
seats to their troop contribution levels.144 In other words, five EU member states hold 
seats equal in stature to the European Commission, which theoretically should be 
promoting the coordination of the EU member state activities. 
 
Figure 13. Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board145 
                                                 
144 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “JCMB Terms of Reference,” 1–2.  
145 After Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “JCMB Terms of Reference,” 1–2; World Bank, “The 
World Bank in Afghanistan,” April 2007. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/-
Resources/305984-1171214014238/AFUpdateApr07.pdf (accessed December 3, 2009). 2. 
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Under the JCMB and its secretariat are a series of GIRoA-led Consultative 
Groups and Working Groups. The 28 Working Groups (WGs), sometimes referred to as 
Technical Working Groups (TWGs), collect and prepare data for the eight Consultative 
Groups (CGs) to measure progress against the benchmarks established in the Afghanistan 
Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.146 The eight CGs 
represent each of the eight sector pillars of the ANDS.  
 
Figure 14. JCMB Support Structure147 
EU donors are active in the Working Groups and Technical Working 
Groups, acting primarily in an advisory capacity, but also as providers of information for 
the GIRoA-led bodies. The implementing agencies for the EC and the EU member states, 
such as development agencies or NGOs, also participate in applicable sector WGs and 
TWGs in the regions in which they operate. 
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The EU donors are integrated into the current coordination mechanisms 
established for development activities in Afghanistan. However, the ability of these 
mechanisms to effectively coordinate development activities is in question. Their ability 
to contribute to aid effectiveness and coordination among the EU donors is even less 
clear.  
D. CONCLUSION 
One major problem in intra-EU cooperation is the fact that the European 
Commission practices “external relations,” while EU member states exercise their right to 
practice foreign policies. In 2006 Michael Smith, Brian Crowe, and John Peterson wrote 
that “The Commission is only ‘fully associated’ (that is, it has a lesser position than 
member states) and the EP has no power (and little influence) over the common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP).”148 The pattern in Afghanistan to date suggests that the 
European Union’s institutions can only suggest and promote coordination and aid 
effectiveness within the European Union as a whole. Until the EU member states support 
a unified strategy in which one office or individual can direct EU donor activities, the 
challenges of donor coordination and suboptimal aid effectiveness within the EU will 
remain unresolved. Chapter III analyzes the specific aspects of this situation.  
The other critical finding for which this chapter provides a framework is that the 
European Union should not simply follow the ANDS as a development strategy. This is 
not solely due to the challenges associated with the PDPs and DDPs. As a major donor, 
the European Union has the opportunity to address regional development strategies that 
could leverage value chains and greatly assist the GIRoA in achieving the overarching 
goals outlined in the ANDS. By combining the sectoral areas on which the EU desires to 
focus with a geographic analysis of available natural resources in Afghanistan, the EU 
can adjust its strategy to encompass large-scale, linked projects that leverage existing 
                                                 
148 Michael E. Smith, Brian Crowe, and John Peterson, “International Interests: The Common Foreign 
and Security Policy,” In The Institutions of the European Union, by John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, 
252–271. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 253–254. Michael E. Smith is a Reader in International 
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value chains far beyond the capability of most donors in Afghanistan. These projects 
could provide the Afghans with the long-term, sustainable economic growth that they 
desire. This possibility is further examined in Chapter IV. 
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III. THE “SUPER ENVOY” OPTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Donor Activity in Afghanistan  
An assessment of the European Union’s collective contribution to the intervention 
in Afghanistan shows that the EU remains deeply engaged across the spectrum of efforts. 
The seeming reluctance of some of the EU member states to engage in combat operations 
to assist the security effort is offset by collective EU efforts to support the numerous 
aspects of civilian intervention, such as economic and social development as well as 
building the capacity of the Afghans to govern themselves.   
The European Union, like many donor nations and organizations, is struggling to 
overcome the many challenges present in Afghanistan. Although the current EU 
development strategy has an overall theme (supporting the agreed official Afghan vision), 
there are no effective mechanisms to coordinate the efforts of the EU donors in 
Afghanistan. Moreover, this problem is prevalent within the entire donor community in 
Afghanistan. In “The Seven Capital Sins of the Donor Community in Afghanistan,” 
Serge Michailof, former director of operations of a French aid agency,
 
underscores this 
by noting that “the lack of serious coordination and strategic planning among key donors 
in Afghanistan has seriously undermined aid effectiveness.”149 The problem is 
exacerbated by the inability of any one nation or organization to effectively design and 
implement a development strategy that other nations and organizations will follow. A 
study conducted by the Center of the Study for the Presidency notes that “Neither the 




                                                 
149 Serge Michailof, “The Seven Capital Sins of the Donor Community in Afghanistan,” The German 
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representing donor nation policies…This approach has consistently failed to yield either 
adequate resources or effective multinational collaboration.”150 The effects of this 
inefficiency are difficult to overstate.  
In monetary terms, the cost of this lack of coordination is staggering. As of 
September 30, 2008, over $57 billion had been pledged for loans and grants in 
Afghanistan in 2001–2009, with the United States as the largest donor (nearly $32 
billion).151 Included in this total are the pledges by donor nations at the 2008 Paris Donor 
Conference to provide $21 billion of the $50 billion requested by Afghan President 
Hamid Karzai for the next five years. In addition to these amounts, the United States 
promised to provide approximately $5 billion in further aid in June 2009, bringing the 
U.S. total alone to over $39 billion.152 According to figures compiled by Rhoda 
Margesson, the expenditures and pledges by the European Commission combined with 
those of the EU member states will amount to $10.1 billion between 2002 and 2011.153  
However, for the EU, the massive amount of funds involved is not accompanied 
by a commensurate effort in coordinating the activities of the EU institutions and the EU 
member states. According to Daniel Korski, a Senior Policy Fellow for the European 
Council for Foreign Relations, “In Afghanistan…the EU effort seems disorganised: 
chains of command are unclear and coordination is generally weak.”154 As a result of this 
lack of a coordinated development strategy, billions of euros have been wasted through 
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“project fratricide,”155 and through donors pursuing short-term projects with no long-
term objectives. A 2008 United Kingdom International Development Committee report 
states that, “according to the Peace Dividend Trust, out of a total US $1.36 billion spent 
between March 2005 and March 2006 from major donors the local impact was around 
31% or the equivalent of $424 million,” and that “Problems of donor coordination are 
leading to a proliferation of disparate projects, low local impact of funding and creating a 
poor impression in Afghanistan about donors’ lack of agreement.”156 Šárka Waisová 
sums up the problem as follows: “According to some observers, Afghanistan is slowly 
transforming into a black hole absorbing billions without any noticeable positive effect 
on the life of the population and stability of state institutions.”157 The enormous amount 
of donor aid flowing into Afghanistan and the continuing lack of coordination 
foreshadow more costly inefficiency in the future.  
2. The Role of the United Nations 
Any discussion regarding development activities in Afghanistan must take into 
account the role of the United Nations (UN). A major portion of international 
intervention and activity in Afghanistan falls under the scope of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 (2001), authorizing the creation of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF),158 and UNSCR 1401 (2002), providing for the 
creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA).159 
UNAMA’s mission is to “promote peace, stability and progress in Afghanistan by 
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leading the efforts of the international community.”160 UNAMA’s mandate has been 
renewed annually since 2002 and has been extended through March 23, 2010 by UNSCR 
1868 (2009).161  
As Rhoda Margesson has noted, UNSCR 1868 (2009) “incorporates UNAMA’s 
increased scope, which includes leading international civilian efforts,” and provides for 
UNAMA “coordination of the assistance provided by international donors and 
organizations.”162 Additionally, because UMAMA serves as the co-chair of the Joint 
Coordination and Monitoring Board, “U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 (2008) and 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1868 (2009) direct UNAMA, in that capacity, to 
coordinate the work of international donors and organizations with an emphasis on aid 
effectiveness.”163 Finally, UNSCR 1868 provides the UNAMA Special Representative 
for the Secretary General (SR-SG) with a leadership role in international civilian efforts, 
especially in the “mobilization of resources, [and] coordination of the assistance provided 
by international donors and organizations.”164 However, although these documents 
provide UNAMA with a firm basis in legitimacy, they are certainly not regarded as 
binding by those actors participating in development efforts in Afghanistan; and the 
European Commission and the EU member states are no exception. Daniel Korski 
affirms that “while many European governments have pushed for the UN to take on a 
stronger role in policy development and coordination, few have given the UN mission in 
Afghanistan and Kai Eide, the Norwegian diplomat who serves as the special 
representative of the UN secretary general, the necessary support, staff or resources, 
either in New York or Kabul.”165 
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3. Research Design 
This chapter investigates the hypothesis that the designation of a “super envoy” 
with the ability to direct a portion of EU donor resources and projects, both at the EU and 
EU member state levels, could increase the effectiveness of EU development activities in 
Afghanistan. To that end, two possible “super envoy” solutions are examined that diverge 
from “staying the course” with the current EU development strategy. One possibility is 
the formal support of the UNAMA Special Representative for the Secretary General (SR-
SG) by the EU and the EU member states, allowing him to direct a portion of donor 
resources from those actors.166 A second possibility involves the designation of an EU 
civilian development coordinator with the ability to direct a portion of EU donor 
resources.  
Although the EU intervention in Kosovo provides useful precedents to consider 
when examining these possibilities, care must be taken in comparing post-conflict 
environments. David Yost, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, has highlighted 
some differences between Kosovo and Afghanistan in 2007. 
By contrast, the military presence in Afghanistan has been effective in 
various ways, but the civilian presence has been less successfully 
coordinated than in Kosovo. The difference may be partly explained by 
the fact that Kosovo is not an independent state, while Afghanistan is a 
sovereign country. In Kosovo the United Nations has had leadership and 
governance responsibilities that belong to the national authorities in 
Afghanistan. The UN “footprint” has accordingly been much lighter in 
Afghanistan than in Kosovo. Several expert observers maintain that the 
UN “footprint” in Afghanistan has in fact been “too light.” In their view, 
the United Nations should have a much stronger presence in the field in 
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should have long ago taken a more vigorous and higher-level approach in 
order to coordinate more effectively the activities of the many states, 
international organizations, and NGOs active in this country.167 
Although the EU’s intervention in Kosovo occurred in a more mature and stable 
post-conflict environment than that in Afghanistan, the EU “super envoy” concept might 
be analogous to the position of Richard Zink, who served as the first director for the 
European Agency for Reconstruction in the Balkans in 2000. This position provides a 
more relevant example of an EU “super envoy” than that of the EU’s Special 
Representative in Bosnia, Lord Paddy Ashdown, who had been “given a special double-
hatted role in ensuring overall coordination of EU activities” in the Balkans168 but acted 
primarily in a coordinating role. Zink’s role in implementing EU reconstruction programs 
not only affected security, but had political ramifications as well. As Zink deemed the 
Agency’s efforts successful overall, this example could provide useful lessons for the EU 
to emulate in Afghanistan.169   
In an examination of these possibilities, this chapter addresses certain questions. 
First, what is the probability that a “super envoy” method would result in increased 
coordination of EU development spending? Furthermore, what have been the specific 
historical issues concerning EU donor coordination? How might the “super envoy” 
method address these issues? What appear to be the advantages and drawbacks to each 
method—that is, an EU “super envoy” and an empowered SR-SG? How could the EU 
take steps to mitigate the potential problems? Given the dynamics of the European Union, 
which method would probably gain the most support within the EU and which would be 
the most effective? 
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Following a review of the relevant literature, this chapter examines the historical 
issues that have resulted in a lack of coordination in Afghanistan, especially in the 
context of EU donor activities. An examination of specific donor coordination examples 
supports the analysis of whether a “super envoy” solution might successfully address 
these challenges. Following this section is a discussion of the UNAMA and EU “super 
envoy” recommendations, with an examination of the advantages, disadvantages, and 
other considerations that accompany both possibilities. This leads to a comparison of 
both methods to determine, given the EU’s dynamics, which is likely to be the most 
feasible option.  
B. EU DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN: THE CURRENT SITUATION 
1. Lack of Coordination 
The lack of donor coordination in Afghanistan is widely recognized.170 The 
numerous donor and development agencies operating there pursue their own strategies 
and priorities. Iselin Hebbert Larsen, an official in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, illustrates a key challenge in this area: 
The organizational set-up is problematic also because there are three 
supranational structures seeking to coordinate civilian efforts: UNAMA, 
the European Union and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR). 
Coordination of donor funds is difficult for any institution because power 
over the purse sits in the capitals and philosophies differ as to how aid 
should be spent to be most effective. Today there are three such 
organizations – surely a waste of resources and time.171 
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In addition to the three organizations listed by Larsen, the international donor 
organizations operating in Afghanistan include the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the Aga Khan Development Network. National development agencies such as 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA), Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI), United 
Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID), Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA), and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) offer further examples of donor organizations in Afghanistan 
with few effective ties to each other. Afghan development efforts under various 
ministries, such as the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), as 
well as nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 
also operate within the constraints of their respective agencies.172  
As Rhoda Margesson has noted, “Some observers argue that the Afghan 
government, international organizations, NGOs, donor countries, and others are 
following their own priorities and programs, and therefore do not coordinate their efforts 
as effectively as possible.”173 NGOs are an especially good example of this phenomenon. 
Estimates of the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan vary, 
but they number in the thousands.174 Šárka Waisová asserts that they offer a “Paradox of 
Plurality” situation, which she defines as “an exceedingly high number of actors, 
performing [the] same or similar activities in parallel and without mutual 
coordination.”175  
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The European Union, as the second largest donor in Afghanistan176 outside of the 
United States, is no stranger to the challenges inherent in conducting aid and 
development activities in this war-torn country. Given the EU’s civilian expertise, as well 
as its preference for non-violent means of dealing with issues in the international arena, it 
is difficult to understand in general terms why the EU has not yet successfully devised 
and implemented a method to effectively manage its development and donor activities. 
However, those familiar with the functioning of the EU, and the disparity of the actors 
involved in any EU operation, acknowledge the difficulties that ensue as a result of the 
varying mandates and objectives of the EU’s institutions and especially of the member 
states themselves. As Daniel Korski has observed, “Individual EU member states, which 
contribute well over double the amount of funding provided by the European 
Commission, have failed to act as a coherent donor group. Instead, they have adopted 
divergent and often incompatible approaches.”177 
2. EU Views on Lack of Donor Coordination 
Within the EU, it is clear from both the European Commission’s Country Strategy 
Paper (CSP) for Afghanistan and from reports of progress by EU development agencies 
(reflecting the views of the EU member states) that the EU understands the lack of 
coordination and the need for a unified European Union strategy. An analysis of the 
publications of EU donor organizations active in Afghanistan—such as the Danish and 
Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, DfID, and SIDA—illustrates their understanding of 
the donor coordination challenges. However, there are no binding unified strategies to 
facilitate the coordination of their activities. As a 2008 United Kingdom report on 
reconstruction in Afghanistan noted, “the development community needs a body of 
agreed principles every bit as much as the military.”178 Although the EU CSP takes note 
of the “European Consensus on EU Development Policy” adopted by the General Affairs 
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and External Relations Council (GAERC) on November 22, 2005, the EU member states 
clearly do not regard that document as binding and have continued to pursue their own 
mandates.179 A combined report from five European Union national development 
agencies noted that, “While the Donors together…have shared some common 
approaches, and have collaborated well on specific issues, they have not acted as a group. 
Likewise, it has not been possible to identify a ‘European model’ for assistance to 
Afghanistan, although guidance has been sought on political matters with the European 
Union.”180 Perhaps Giji Gya and Olivier Jacquemet best summarize the problem: 
“everybody [in the EU] recognizes the need for coordination, but no one wants to be 
coordinated.181 
There are several reasons why the EU donors, especially the member states, resist 
efforts to create a unified EU strategy. First, there is a tendency for inflexible donors to 
plan projects based on current priorities—for near-term effects visible to parliaments and 
attentive publics at home.182 This marginalizes long-term planning, as well as 
coordination with other donors who may not share their priorities. Next, EU donors have 
established funding channels, such as NGOs and contractors, with whom they are 
accustomed to working.183 Donors tend to resist sweeping changes to their established 
programs as well as to their overall strategies, because it creates difficulties and takes 
                                                 
179 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007–2013,” 
Europa – External Relations.  http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/csp/07_13_en.pdf 
(accessed July 28, 2009). 31. 
180 Denmark. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark DANIDA, “Humanitarian and Reconstruction 
Assistance to Afghanistan 2001–2005: From Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, A Joint Evaluation,” October 2005. http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/3821B509-6B3B-4EFC-
97C4-A89FC49C96D2/0/Afghanistan_mainreport.pdf (accessed November 20, 2009). 22. The report 
encompassed the operations of the Danish Development Agency (DANIDA), Development Cooperation 
Ireland (DCI), Netherland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA), and the UK Department for International Development (DfID). 
181 Interview, unnamed source, June 2008, cited in Gya and Jacquemet, “EU Mission Update,” 6. 
182 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its 
Implications for International Peace and Security,” Afghanistan Conflict Monitor – Key Documents. 
September 22, 2009. http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/UNSC_S2009475.pdf (accessed November 20, 
2009). 10. 
183 John Cosgrave and Rie Anderson, Aid Flows to Afghanistan: A Study of Aid Flows from Denmark, 
the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland to Afghanistan from January 2001 to June 2004 Inclusive, 
http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B27A79AA-2B28-4414-A533-46D183CB5890/0/AidFlows 
AfghanistanFinalReportV16020041201.pdf (accessed December 4, 2009). 39. The European Commission 
also falls into this category. 
 65
them out of their “comfort zones.” Another consideration is that EU member states have 
certain civilian skill sets that they have developed over time, notably during European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) operations. These member states will favor 
engagement in ANDS sectors where they believe that they can contribute the most value. 
Finally, perhaps the most important factor preventing the EU member states from 
agreeing to a “super envoy” solution is the loss of control over their funds. Besides the 
obvious reasons why EU donors would resist this idea, there is also the possibility of 
future political or legal issues if relinquished donor funds were used in a manner that 
members of parliament and/or attentive publics could find objectionable. For example, a 
decision by UNAMA to use donor funds from Denmark to develop a coal or asbestos 
economic value chain in Afghanistan would likely be politically controversial in 
Denmark and the EU.   
Nevertheless, EU donors in Afghanistan agree that the issue of development 
coordination represents an extraordinary challenge that must be addressed. The CSP 
states that success in the future depends on ensuring that “donors’ inputs are effectively 
coordinated.”184 This seems to point to an inadequacy in the current documents that 
guide the EU development strategy in Afghanistan, such as the Country Strategy Paper, 
the Multi-annual Indicative Program (MIP), and the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS). The question then remains: how best to achieve this coordination? Jo 
Coelmont suggests that “the EU needs a coherent ‘Grand Strategy’ about the values it 
wants to protect and how it should act as a responsible actor…to empower these 
values.”185 The importance of a unified European Union strategy cannot be overstated. 
The absence of a unified and politically supported EU development strategy will prevent 
EU reconstruction and development efforts from reaching their full potential.  
3. Support for the “Super Envoy” Solution 
The concept of a “super envoy” to manage donor efforts in Afghanistan is not a 
new one. Indeed, it would seem a natural extension of the current structure of the 
international intervention efforts in Afghanistan. For example, there is a single (U.N. 
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mandated) security coordinator in Afghanistan with the ability to direct resources and 
activities—the ISAF Commander (although there are certainly limits on his ability to 
coordinate security activities).186 Yet, security is not the only line of effort in 
Afghanistan. With the ongoing large-scale efforts in economic and social development, 
as well as in governance capacity building, the idea of a civilian coordinator for non-
security-related efforts is not farfetched. In its 2008 report, the U.S. Center for the Study 
of the Presidency recommended tasking “a high-level international coordinator…to 
ensure that all international assistance programs have a coordinated strategy.”187 Michael 
E. O’Hanlon and Ömer Taşpinar support this idea, with the further qualification that 
“with two-thirds of all economic and development assistance of non-U.S. origins, the aid 
and development coordinator should be European.”188 Given the general European Union 
preference for non-combat-related activities in Afghanistan, as well as the expertise that 
the EU has developed in these areas, this seems to be a reasonable approach.  
However, most calls for a civilian coordinator have pointed to the United Nations 
and UNAMA. As early as 2005, the participants in a Wilton Park conference 
recommended that a post-Bonn compact “constitute a qualitative advance in 
coordination, for which UNAMA should be responsible,”189 signaling support for the 
UNAMA SR-SG. Similarly, Daniel Korski has written that “The position of the UN 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) should be upgraded to a ‘Super 
Envoy’ role, with the EU and NATO signaling full support for this person’s leadership, 
and either mandating the person simultaneously or each contributing a Deputy 
Envoy.”190   
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Michael O’Hanlon and Ömer Taşpinar support the idea that “an international aid 
coordinator…should be named – somewhat along the Paddy Ashdown model from 
Bosnia in the 1990s,” noting that “The current U.N. coordinator does not have nearly 
enough control over most funds to play this role.”191 Daniel Korski provided a seemingly 
contradictory opinion with his statement that “Afghanistan in 2007 is not in need of a 
Bosnia-style High Representative…[as such a] concentration of power over the 
international effort carries risks. But, as The Economist notes, sticking to the present 
course in Afghanistan would be even more hazardous.”192 This latter statement has 
implications for the EU in deciding on a unified donor coordination strategy in 
Afghanistan. The choice to relinquish national or European Commission control of a 
portion of donor resources would undoubtedly be a difficult one, but it may be necessary 
to achieve greater success in development and reconstruction efforts. 
4. EU Views on the “Super Envoy” Solution 
Much of the literature within EU development agencies points to the UNAMA 
“super envoy” option. However, the EU institutions and member states have not been 
able to effectively gather behind the UNAMA option. In a 2008 report, the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) expressed disappointment that 
“sufficient international momentum could not be gained for the appointment of a high 
level joint UN, NATO, EU coordinator for Afghanistan” and further asserted that, “if the 
international community will not agree to the appointment of a super envoy, ways must 
be found to ensure that the role of the UN Special Representative is properly resourced, 
and that the incumbent has sufficient weight in dealing with partner countries.”193 
However, neither DfID nor any other national EU development agency has come up with 
a realistic way to support this plan. Serge Michailof has aptly summed up the prevalent 
view with the statement that, “Since there is a broad agreement to entrust this overall 
coordination responsibility to the UN, it now seems that the best option would be that 
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[the UNAMA SR-SG] Eide receives the resources and a clear mandate to drive the aid 
agenda and impose discipline and coherence to donor efforts.”194 Yet, this “broad 
agreement” has not translated into action on the part of the EU and its member states. 
Conversely, the EU professional development literature does not, for the most 
part, propose an EU alternative to the UNAMA “super envoy” solution. The majority of 
EU member state development agencies profess support for UNAMA as opposed to a 
European coordinator, although Daniel Korski has recommended the elevation of the 
Office of the Special Representative of the European Union to Afghanistan to encompass 
additional responsibilities.195 The evident lack of practical support for the UNAMA 
option would seem to indicate that EU member states might not in practice support an EU 
“super envoy” option either, without a pressing rationale.   
5. “Stay the Course”: Alternatives to the “Super Envoy” Solution 
Development strategies currently pursued by the EU donors follow the Afghan 
plan—the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. However, this strategy has a 
number of problems, besides the ample empirical evidence that donor coordination lacks 
effectiveness in many areas. For example, this strategy disregards the possibility that the 
ANDS and its implementing mechanisms, the Provincial Development Plans, do not 
constitute a cohesive and effective plan. This possibility is examined in Chapter IV. 
Another issue is that, although the ANDS examines the aid coordination mechanisms in 
detail, most of its recommendations and proposals to improve donor coordination do not 
significantly depart from the current aid coordination structure—which has proved 
inadequate to date.196   
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The coordination mechanisms that are in place and discussed in the Analytical 
Framework chapter of this thesis (Chapter II) are supported in the ANDS. They provide 
some basis for donor coordination, and thus could support an argument for staying the 
course by building on these processes.197 However, neither the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) nor UNAMA, as co-chairs of the JCMB, have 
the ability to make binding decisions at the national or sub-national level to improve 
donor coordination. The UN Secretary General noted this in his 2009 report:  
This model — leadership by the government of Afghanistan in setting 
policies and defining programmes, followed by Joint Coordination and 
Monitoring Board approval and ensuing donor support — has become the 
template for aid coordination. Donors, however, often remain 
insufficiently flexible, preferring to plan future funding decisions based on 
current priorities, rather than adjust their allocations quickly.198  
The inflexibility of donors is an issue noted in the ANDS and other documents, and it is 
certainly a key contributor to aid ineffectiveness.  
There are other methods to improve donor coordination that the EU could adopt 
within the current framework. Various actors in Afghanistan, notably those operating at 
the sub-national level, have become disillusioned with the lack of donor coordination at 
the national and international level and have attempted to implement scaled donor 
coordination strategies. For example, ISAF is attempting to implement a Regional 
Command South (RC-South) Civil-Military Coordination Cell in order to “ensure that the 
localized effects of PRTs in RC-South are complementary to one another and translate 
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into overall regional stability.”199 The ISAF plan is to “Request GIRoA and international 
community support and backing for integrated regional governance, reconstruction, and 
development priorities.”200 Still, the lack of any binding authority to direct activities is 
apparent. A more comprehensive example of this type of regional planning and 
coordination, which the EU could emulate, is represented by the U.S. government 
interagency plan called “Nangarhar Inc,” and is examined in Chapter IV.  
Another possibility is to continue to pursue an approach initiated by Task Force 
Bayonet in RC-East in 2007–2008, in which the brigade staff and the Nangarhar PRT 
began a plan of “district mapping” in order to account for all reconstruction projects 
being pursued in a province, with all the relevant Afghan, NGO, and other actors 
participating. The initial conference, held on June 19, 2008 in the city of Jalalabad, 
Afghanistan, was the beginning of a plan coordinated by the author in conjunction with 
the Nangarhar PRT.201 ISAF subsequently adopted the plan, which was mentioned by the 
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While these last two examples represent noteworthy attempts to improve donor 
coordination by actors operating at the sub-national level, they do not address the 
fundamental challenge of improving EU donor coordination in Afghanistan. No single 
agency has the ability to direct EU donor resources in a binding manner that would 
enhance donor coordination at all levels.  
C. SOLUTIONS 
1. What Needs Fixing? Examples of Donor Coordination Challenges in 
Afghanistan 
UNAMA’s SR-SG for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, has stated that “some efforts by 
international donors duplicate each other.”203 This is almost certainly an understatement. 
Šárka Waisová was referring to Afghanistan when she stated that “Actors involved in 
post-conflict reconstruction are unable and often unwilling to coordinate their 
reconstruction efforts, which results in overlapping and duplicating projects and [a] waste 
of both energy and financial resources.”204 DfID noted, in the period prior to its February 
2008 report to the UK House of Commons, the prevalence of “[in]sufficient collaboration 
on project work, which inevitably leads to duplication or incoherence of activities by 
different donors.”205 The author termed these overlapping and duplicative endeavors 
“project fratricide,” and has noted that lack of donor coordination in the Eastern Region 
of Afghanistan (defined by the provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and Nuristan) 
has led to numerous instances of this phenomenon.206   
As an example, in February 2008, a representative from the Afghan Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s (MRRD) National Area-Based Development 
Program (NABDP) noted that the GIRoA had obtained $100,000 to construct a mid-sized 
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dam project to improve water management for agricultural use in Nangarhar Province. 
When the MRRD’s contractor visited the proposed location to conduct a site survey, the 
contractor discovered that an NGO was constructing a similar project with $30,000 in 
funds at that location, but the project was not being completed on a scale that would 
provide a permanent solution. This representative also informed the author that $2.5 
million had been provided by the Asian Development Bank, and was being used 
primarily to build gabion walls and check dams in Nangarhar Province.207 However, a 
large number of these small-scale projects are washed away by floods in the absence of a 
large-scale watershed management plan.208 Year after year, uncoordinated development 
agencies rebuild these projects while a larger project, such as a comprehensive watershed 
management plan with large dams and an erosion control design, would create a 
permanent solution.  
In some cases, the challenge comes from the failure of donor agencies to 
coordinate with the GIRoA itself, and not solely from a lack of coordination with other 
donors. Donors have built schools without coordination with the Afghan Ministry of 
Education (MoE). Some of these schools have remained empty due to the lack of 
teachers, books, and school supplies, which the MoE did not agree to provide in those 
areas. It is not unusual for these “schools” to be converted into stables for animals or 
employed for some other purpose unrelated to education. As further evidence of the 
coordination challenges in this area, Daniel Korski points out that “the Danish 
government is investing half of its assistance to Helmand province in schools, even 
though the local population cannot defend them from Taliban attack.”209  
2. The “Super Envoy” Concept 
The years of coordination challenges in Afghanistan have resulted in action on the 
part of some nations participating in the intervention in Afghanistan. In January 2009, the 
United States appointed Richard Holbrooke as the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan. The following month, Germany and the United Kingdom followed suit with 
Bernd Mützelberg and Sherard Cowper-Coles, respectively, as special envoys for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In March 2009, France continued the trend by appointing 
Pierre Lellouche in a similar role.210 According to the U.S. government’s January 2010 
Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Strategy, “28 countries and international 
organizations, including the most active diplomatic, financial, and military actors in the 
region, have appointed Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan.”211 This 
highlights the growing importance of the intervention in Afghanistan. While the duty 
description of these statesmen is ostensibly much more comprehensive than development 
and reconstruction, it is telling that governments saw the need to appoint someone to 
synchronize their national strategies in the face of the coordination challenges associated 
with the GIRoA, ISAF, and the UN. Indeed, an EU “super envoy” position might result 
in a replication of the scope of these duties, allowing that person to coordinate other non-
combat-related efforts for the EU, such as governance capacity-building. However, this 
thesis focuses on the donor coordination aspect.  
To address donor coordination for EU development activities, two “super envoy” 
possibilities are apparent. First, the EU could formally support the UNAMA SR-SG as a 
“super envoy,” giving him control over a portion of EU donor funds as well as the ability 
to direct certain development and reconstruction projects. Second, an EU individual or 
agency could be designated with the same authority. Both possibilities address the fact 
that there is a military command with the authority to direct solutions in the security line 
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of effort for the EU nations contributing military forces in Afghanistan (the ISAF 
commander), but a civilian equivalent does not exist for non-security-related efforts. 
a. Benefits: How Could a “Super Envoy” Help? 
An official operating at the top levels of donor activities in Afghanistan 
(working with international donors as well as Afghan Ministers) could in principle 
address many of the historical coordination issues. A 2009 U.S. Department of Defense 
report on Afghanistan asserts that “By improving coordination among international 
contributors, the SRSG position has the potential to help avoid duplication of effort.”212 
However, an EU official, with the same ability to direct EU donor resources, whose 
office was integrated into UNAMA at all levels might have a great potential to improve 
EU donor coordination as well.  
Daniel Korski supports the possibility of the EU (as well as NATO) 
contributing a deputy envoy to UNAMA.213 Korski, perhaps the strongest proponent of a 
“super envoy” solution in published works on Afghanistan, notes that the national 
governments of the EU “have ignored the key lesson of the Balkans: a successful 
international intervention requires unity of purpose, strategy, and command...[and 
resolving] the problems of Afghanistan… is likely to remain impossible as long as… the 
EU fails to unify its own programmes and speak with one voice.”214 Korski observes that 
in Bosnia NATO, the EU, and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) were all 
following different strategies, which were unified under “a detailed, prioritised civil-
military plan,” that is, the OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan.215 The EU’s adoption of 
a “super envoy” strategy would derive directly from these historical lessons, which are 
quite applicable in Afghanistan, despite the fact that the two countries are quite different.  
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Finally, besides addressing the challenges associated with the donor 
activities of the EU (through the European Commission) and the EU member states, the 
“super envoy” option could also address donor problems with certain NGOs and elements 
of ISAF. Successful implementation of the “super envoy” strategy could provide an 
example for NGOs and ISAF to follow, and the improved coordination that an EU “super 
envoy” could bring could also affect NGOs funded by EU member state development 
agencies that operate in Afghanistan, as well as the ISAF Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams that are led and funded by EU member states.  
b. Challenges in Implementation 
Although the concept of a “super envoy” to improve donor coordination 
within the EU is attractive, the implementation of such a strategy is problematic. Either 
version of the “super envoy” plan would require a proposal to be drafted by the European 
Commission, in close cooperation with the EU member states, for approval by the 
European Council, and perhaps ratified by the President of the European Council, 
Herman Van Rompuy. No other method would have a binding effect on the member 
states of the European Union. The largest single point of contention would most likely be 
the loss of control over a portion of donor funds and projects by the EU member states 
and the European Commission, whether to a supranational EU official or to the UNAMA 
SR-SG. This contention would be understandable, but a 2008 report on Afghanistan by 
the Center for the Study of the Presidency made a pertinent point: “While it cannot be 
expected that countries will completely give up control on how their resources are spent, 
there needs to be a mechanism that provides some power to the coordinator or he will not 
be able to adequately perform the task at hand.”216 The questions at this point seem to be, 
what amount of control of donor resources should be relinquished, what amount will be 
willingly surrendered by the member states of the EU, and what would be the distribution 
between the European Commission’s and the EU members states’ donor funds? 
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Perhaps the most feasible design at the outset (not least in order to 
facilitate the approval of the plan) would be to determine which aspects of the European 
Commission’s Multi-annual Indicative Plan (MIP) for Afghanistan would best be 
assumed by UNAMA to facilitate donor coordination on a small scale at the outset. Areas 
of the MIP that focus on the achievement of the UN’s Millennium development goals, 
such as Rural Development Social Development, and the Health Sector are likely starting 
points. Additionally, initial recommendations on the scope of funds to “transfer” to 
UNAMA control would likely be premature until consultations with the EU member 
states revealed the level of loss of control those actors would be willing to accept for the 
possibility of improved donor coordination within the EU. Especially in the UNAMA 
option, it would certainly be possible for the EU to stipulate that the EU funds 
relinquished must be utilized in areas of EU focus (according to the EU’s MIP or in areas 
where EU PRTs operate). Yet, more than a general stipulation to that end would be 
counterproductive and defeat the purpose of the plan. Every restriction placed on funds 
set aside for a super envoy’s use and coordination would significantly reduce the 
effectiveness of the EU plan as an example for others to emulate.  
However, a simple relinquishment of funds is not sufficient. EU member 
states must be willing to accept the direction of a “super envoy” in the deconfliction of 
certain reconstruction and development projects. That is, the “super envoy” must be able 
to direct some EU donors to fund and execute specific projects, while assigning separate 
projects to other EU donor agencies to prevent project duplication and overlap. An EU 
“super envoy” would be able to take into account the preferences and capabilities of the 
member states and their implementing partners and NGOs. In the UNAMA option, a 
European Union Deputy SR-SG would ideally provide this same input to the UNAMA 
SR-SG. The scope of this control over EU projects would almost certainly be a major 
point of discussion by EU member states in the creation of this plan.  
c. Staffing 
Both options, save for the suboptimal plan of appointing an EU envoy not 
integrated into UNAMA, would entail the provision of staffing support to UNAMA, 
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whether directly, or under an EU Deputy SR-SG. This would address the widely 
recognized understaffing problem associated with UNAMA.217 The Afghanistan Study 
Group’s recommendation that “the international coordinator be assigned a joint 
professional staff representing a wide range of the major partnering countries and 
organizations in Afghanistan” could be tailored to the EU by selecting a representative 
staff to support the plan as implemented.218 
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3. UNAMA Option 
As a United Nations entity, UNAMA has a clear basis of authority for conducting 
donor coordination operations in Afghanistan. However, mandates do not always 
translate into reality. Some observers have noted that UNAMA has recently shied away 
from the role of coordinator. Indeed, rhetoric promoting UNAMA as a donor coordinator 
within United Nations reports seems to have decreased between 2002 and 2008. This may 
have been due to the lack of support from donors to accept UNAMA in that role. The 
situation seems to have changed in 2008. Rhoda Margesson notes that “under its recent 
mandates [UNAMA received] a new emphasis on expanding that [coordination] role.”220 
The European Commission’s “State of Play” report reinforces that idea with the 
statement that “UNAMA has been reinforcing its capacity for donor coordination, 
although difficulties remain.”221 Further, Rhoda Margesson notes that “Significantly, 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 (2008) expanded the mandate to include a ‘super 
envoy’ concept that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”222 This increased emphasis on donor coordination 
seemed to be confirmed at a July 2009 press conference, when Mark Ward, the Special 
Advisor on Development to the UNAMA SR-SG, stated that “UNAMA hired me to lead 
the donor coordination effort in Afghanistan.”223 
Indeed, UNSCR 1868 (2009) provides as a key area of UNAMA’s work to 
“promote…more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan 
government…[including] coordination of the assistance provided by international donors 
and organizations.”224 Here, perhaps the most telling word is “promote.” As the last 
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seven years in Afghanistan have shown, UNAMA’s ability to promote coordination has 
met with mixed success. There is no consensus or agreement providing UNAMA with the 
power to effectively direct coordination efforts. Barnett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada and 
Abby Stoddard acknowledge this difficulty: “UNAMA has to rely on the voluntary 
willingness of the civilian actors to cooperate because the UN did not put obligations on 
the participating actors.”225 This thesis examines the possibility of the European Union 
and its member states willingly accepting these obligations. Specifically, this would 
entail the European Council, and perhaps the newly appointed President of the European 
Council, formally supporting the ability of the UNAMA SR-SG to make binding 
decisions regarding a significant portion of EU donor funds and projects. 
a. Considerations for Implementation 
As noted, UNAMA currently does not possess the staff necessary to 
effectively manage donor coordination efforts. In the case of the European Union, 
providing UNAMA with appropriate staff levels would offer two benefits. First, it would 
address the challenges that UNAMA has encountered with insufficient resources, and 
second, it would provide the European Union with a modicum of oversight on the use of 
its resources.   
b. Challenges with Implementation 
In this scenario, both the EU member states as well as the European Union 
(through the Commission) would probably lose control over donor resources, as opposed 
to the EU option, in which the EU would still maintain a relatively high level of control 
over its “supranational” European Commission funds. This might not address one of the 
root causes for reluctance by EU member states to embrace a unified strategy, 
considering that UNAMA could use EU donor funds in a manner that might be politically 
                                                 
225 Barnett R. Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard, Afghanistan 2005 and 
Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, 2005, http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/cling-afg-apr05.pdf 
(accessed November 28, 2007), cited in Andreas Kuehne, “Scrutinizing and Assessing the Perfomance of 
the German and U.S.-Led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, June 2008). 33. 
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sensitive in the EU. Additionally, this option would not necessarily ensure the 
establishment of a formal EU staffing structure in UNAMA, as the details would depend 
on the willingness of UNAMA to accept this support.   
4. EU Option 
A 2008 United Kingdom International Development Committee report refers to 
an unsuccessful effort to appoint a “high-level joint UN, NATO, EU coordinator for 
Afghanistan,”226 leaving a void in which the EU donor coordination issue remained 
unresolved. An alternative to the formal support of the UNAMA SR-SG as a “super 
envoy” would be the appointment of a European Union “super envoy.” In support of this 
idea, a January 2009 report by Julian Lindley-French recommended that “The European 
Union should also appoint a senior representative in Afghanistan to coordinate non-
military efforts.”227 Although this possibility is not widely discussed in the relevant 
literature, it is worthy of further analysis. 
a. Considerations for Implementation 
The first challenge with this option is determining how to select and 
support the EU “super envoy.” There are a number of existing offices that could be 
“elevated” to this post. However, consideration should also be given to creating a 
separate position and support structure. 
(1) The most obvious option would be the new “double-hatted” 
position of the EU Special Representative for Afghanistan (EUSRA) and the head of the 
European Union’s delegation in Kabul. On February 22, 2010, the European Union High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, announced her 
choice of former Lithuanian foreign minister Vygaudas Ušackas to assume this 
                                                 
226 House of Commons, Reconstructing Afghanistan, 9. 
227 Julian Lindley-French, “Enhancing Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. January 22, 2009. http://csis.org/publication/enhancing-stabilization-
and-reconstruction-operations (accessed November 20, 2009). x–xi. 
 81
position.228 Ušackas will benefit from the new mandate for the EUSRA, which was 
recently expanded to encompass Pakistan. The new mandate empowers this position to 
“contribute to the implementation of the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration and the 
Afghanistan Compact.” This includes goals for economic and social development.229 
(2) A second option might be to empower a representative of the 
EuropeAid Director General as an EU “super envoy” for Afghanistan. The EuropeAid 
Director General “manages [worldwide] EU external aid programmes.” Koos Richelle 
currently serves in this position under the purview of the “Development” Commissioner 
Andris Piebalgs and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso.230 
Although the current EuropeAid Director General’s office might be in a position to 
assume the duties of an EU “super envoy,” it would probably involve some personnel 
movements from Brussels to Kabul. Also, as manager of all of the European 
Commission’s external aid programmes, this office may not have a knowledge of 
Afghanistan-specific issues as extensive as that of some EU representatives currently 
operating in Afghanistan. Finally, given the political nature of this position, an 
insufficiently empowered coordinator would encounter significant challenges in the 
conduct of his or her duties. However, a seasoned EuropeAid representative under 
Richelle or Piebalgs, with an adequate support staff, could be a viable option.  
(3) Other options might also be considered. Another possibility 
would involve the appointment of a person in a newly created position—that of an EU 
“super envoy” for development. In the context of Afghanistan, there are various ways to 
integrate a position of this type. Since the European Commission has a seat on the Joint 
                                                 
228 Toby Vogel, Ashton to Name New Afghanistan Envoy, January 29, 2010. 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/01/ashton-to-name-new-afghanistan-envoy/67026.aspx 
(accessed March 2, 2010); Toby Vogel, Lithuanian appointed EUSR to Afghanistan, February 25, 2010. 
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(accessed March 2, 2010). 
229 Human Security Report Project, “Council Joint Action 2009/467/CFSP,” Afghanistan Conflict 
Monitor – Key Documents. June 16, 2009. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/-
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:151:0041:0044:EN:PDF (accessed November 22, 2009). L151/41. 
230 European Commission, EuropeAid – Development Through Multi-stakeholder Co-operation, 
September 3, 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/index_en.htm (accessed February 9, 2010). The 
EuropeAid Director General’s relationship with the newly created position of the EU High Representative 
for Foreign Policy, held by Catherine Ashton, is not yet clear. 
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Coordination and Monitoring Board, as well as in various consultative groups,231 it 
would be possible to simply replace these positions with the EU coordinator and his or 
her representatives. However, this might amount to overlaying a new bureaucracy on top 
of an existing one, with an additional requirement to create a supporting staff for this 
position. An EU “super envoy” appointed in this manner would ideally be fully integrated 
with UNAMA.  
It should be noted that in all the EU “super envoy” possibilities, 
operating outside of UNAMA would prevent EU donor coordination from rising to its 
fullest potential. One possibility would be to integrate the EU coordinator into the 
UNAMA structure as a deputy SR-SG for the European Union, or even in a position 
under the Deputy SR-SG for Relief, Recovery, and Development, in a position 
commensurate with the Special Advisor on Development to the UNAMA SR-SG (see 
Figure 16). This would differ from the same position in the UNAMA option in that, in 
this option, the EU representative would have the ability to direct the EU funds and 
projects in coordination with the UNAMA SR-SG, instead of giving the SR-SG control 
with the EU representative serving in an advisory capacity only. 
 
                                                 
231 European Commission, “State of Play January 2009,” 3. 
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Figure 16. Possible Integration of a Deputy SR-SG for EU Affairs232 
b. Challenges With Implementation 
As compared to the UNAMA option, this option would not necessarily 
require the European Commission to relinquish control of its donor resources and 
projects. It realistically would require only the EU member states to do so. However, 
since the main points of contention are likely to be raised by the members states 
themselves, due to their disparate objectives, this point would probably be of lesser 
import. Also, the EU option possibilities would require the creation of an additional 
bureaucracy, whether as a supplement to a current office, or in support of a new position. 
Finally, there is the question of how to fit a EU “super envoy” into the UNAMA structure 
in a manner that would be most effective, but would still be acceptable to UNAMA—
assuming UNAMA would accept the integration of this position at all. Although from the 
standpoint of the EU, the creation of an additional deputy SR-SG for the coordination of  
 
                                                 
232 Margesson, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan,16; United Nations, United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan.  
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EU donor activities would probably be the best option, UNAMA would probably prefer 
an EU envoy to work under the already-established Deputy SR-SG for Relief, Recovery, 
and Development (see Figure 17).  
 
Figure 17. Possible Integration of a Representative for EU Affairs233 
5. Comparison of Methods 
Both the UNAMA and the EU options have a similar set of requirements. Both 
would require political (and to a lesser extent popular) support. Both would require a 
formal approval process to be prepared by the European Commission and approved by 
the European Council. Both would realistically require input from the EU member states 
in the crafting of the actual plan. Both would involve providing support staff and offices 
to UNAMA, whether in a formal or informal relationship (depending on the appointment 
by the UN of a deputy SR-SG for the EU). Both would require the relinquishment of 
control of a portion of EU donor resources and projects, either by the EU member states, 
or by both the member states and the European Commission. On the positive side, both  
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have the potential to diminish the likelihood of future examples of “project fratricide.” 
However, there would be some differences between the strategies, both in 
implementation and possible effects. 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of the UNAMA Option 
The UNAMA option would present certain disadvantages for the EU. 
Relinquishing control of EU donor assets via the UNAMA option would require a greater 
leap of faith by the institutions and member states of the European Union, and thus might 
be more difficult to achieve politically. Contributing to that difficulty is potential donor 
inflexibility that could stem from firmly established funding mechanisms, relationships, 
and development activities. Inflexible EU donors might be more resistant to the UNAMA 
option. Further, a simple relinquishing of a portion of EU donor assets and control to 
UNAMA without an established agreement between the EU and the UN could cause 
consternation within the EU that funds could be utilized without any EU input. Although 
this would ostensibly be the intent of this process (to allocate funds and control to one 
capable agency that would use it in a coordinated manner), some political pitfalls could 
arise if the funds were used, or projects assigned, in a manner that aggravated political 
sensitivities within the EU—such as the previously mentioned coal and asbestos value 
chain examples.  
However, an advantage to this method, even if the initial quantity of donor 
funds and level of project control relinquished were modest, is that the EU would be 
setting an example for donors to gather behind in a manner that would contribute to real 
and effective coordination by UNAMA. Under UNAMA control, projects would undergo 
the scrutiny of the JCMB and avoid narrow EU donor priorities that could contribute to 
aid ineffectiveness. This could address some of the root causes of the lack of EU 
coordination: (1) the tendency to choose projects based on current priorities, and (2) the 
effects of the disparate priorities of the EU donors. This option, in particular, has the 
greatest potential to reduce the detrimental effects of project duplication and overlap that 
contribute to aid ineffectiveness. The UNAMA option could lead other donors (notably 
the United States, which has not provided a leadership role in this matter) to follow suit 
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and create a lasting improvement in donor coordination. As a final consideration, this 
could serve as the first step toward implementing Daniel Korski’s recommendation: the 
uniting of the EUPOL and European Commission offices under the UNAMA SR-SG, 
providing a unified European Union effort under that office.234 The UNAMA option 
would probably be the most politically and bureaucratically difficult for the EU to set in 
motion, but has the greatest potential to significantly increase EU aid effectiveness. 
b. Advantages and Disadvantages of the EU Option 
The EU “super envoy” option could have the added benefit of allaying 
some of the fears of the EU member states that EU funds might be used in a manner that 
would not reflect the priorities of the EU states, or that could offend political sensitivities 
within the EU. It could also be a more palatable solution for inflexible EU donors by 
permitting them greater influence to maintain their current development themes. 
Assuming that the EU envoy could be fully integrated into UNAMA, this course of 
action could also provide a stepping-stone toward the unification of the EUPol and 
European Commission offices under UNAMA, although in a manner that would provide 
more control for EU leaders. Further, in this option, the EU representative could respond 
to issues raised by EU member states. However, this might prove a drawback as well 
since caveats detract from effective aid coordination. This option has the potential to set a 
standard that other donors could follow, although the influence that the EU would retain 
over how the funds are utilized would reduce the strength of the statement by the EU in 
support of comprehensive donor coordination. In comparison to the UNAMA option, the 
EU option is less likely to significantly reduce EU aid ineffectiveness, but it may be 
politically easier to implement. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The challenge of improving donor coordination in Afghanistan is a difficult one. 
It is even more problematic in the EU, given its dynamics. All available options are 
fraught with obstacles and potential political pitfalls. In that light, and given the disparity 
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in goals among the EU member states, the most viable course of action at the outset 
seems to be for the EU to pursue and adopt the EU “super envoy” option under the newly 
empowered office of the EUSR for Afghanistan. The EU should attempt to integrate this 
position into UNAMA as a Deputy SR-SG, and determine, with the EU member states, 
the level of control of EU donor funds and project control to relinquish to this office at 
the outset. The full weight of the EU behind a unified strategy would provide a compel-
ling rationale for the United Nations to accept this adjustment to UNAMA’s structure. 
For a decision that would probably be politically charged, this option provides the 
potential to increase EU donor coordination, gives the EU member states and the 
European Commission the greatest relative amount of influence over their donor funds, 
does not represent such a departure from the current course that it would be likely to fail 
in the planning stage, and still provides an example that could be emulated by other 
donors in Afghanistan. Finally, it would be easier for the EU to later transition to the 
UNAMA option than it would be to try to wrest control of EU assets and projects back 
from UNAMA. Indeed, the latter possibility would be damaging on a number of levels. 
However, neither of these options would constitute a course of action that would 
be impossible to implement given the dynamics of the EU and the situation in 
Afghanistan. Further, they both identify viable possibilities that might well become 
increasingly more attractive to the leaders of the EU and the EU member states as the 
effectiveness of their donor efforts continues to stagnate and becomes more costly, both 
in financial as well as political terms. If a tipping point is reached where the loss of 
control over some resources may be offset by the prospect of overcoming EU donor 
coordination challenges, the leaders of the EU could endorse one of the courses of action 
discussed in this chapter as a less costly alternative.  
The greatest challenge to the “super envoy” plan is that the European Union 
possesses elements of “common goals or objectives” at the supranational level when the 
European Council approves plans, but the EU is also composed of member states with 
disparate objectives. Yet, Rhoda Margesson holds that “complete coordination may be 
both unnecessary and ineffective, especially when different organizations do not share 
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common goals or strategies.”235 Indeed, comprehensive coordination might objectively 
be an impossible task for the EU in Afghanistan, and the EU’s dynamics will probably 
prevent a complete uniting of goals and priorities. However, if a middle ground can be 
agreed on, even on a small scale, to permit the adoption of a “super envoy” plan that 
improves EU donor coordination in Afghanistan, it could set a powerful example. With 
the collective weight of the European Union behind a unified development strategy, the 
United States and the rest of the donor community in Afghanistan could not help but take 
notice. 
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IV. SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH 
REGIONAL PLANNING 
Robust, sustained economic growth is essential for Afghanistan to secure 
peace and improve human development. First, it is a necessary condition 
to get out of deep poverty – and therefore the central element of a poverty 
reduction strategy….Thus the key development challenge for Afghanistan 
is to put in place the institutions, policies, and services that will generate 
sustained, broad-based economic growth.236 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union donors are struggling to define their development strategy in 
Afghanistan. To improve governance and stability in the region, reduce the flow of 
opium poppy products into the EU, and aid the Afghans in reducing the oppressive 
poverty levels in their country are all important goals of the EU donors’ development 
programs. Certain facts suggest that the EU donors should be effective in Afghanistan. 
Given the EU’s status as the world’s largest aid donor,237 the EU’s institutions and 
member states have a great deal of experience in implementing aid programs in 
developing countries and EU donors understand the value of effective, long-term 
development strategies.  
Further, the European Union and its member states have the potential to influence 
development in Afghanistan on a scale beyond the reach of most other donors. Although 
the United States overshadows all other aid contributors in dollar amounts, the variety of 
skills and competencies represented by the EU donors is impressive. Given the 
tremendous capabilities that the EU donors possess, their development strategy, vision, 
and efforts in Afghanistan should be defined on a similarly grand scale. 
                                                 
236 World Bank, “Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty. A Country 
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237 European Commission, External Cooperation Programmes, September 3, 2009. 
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Yet, a number of factors limit the ability of the EU donors to pursue EU and 
Afghan goals to their fullest potential. The EU’s collective status as the second largest aid 
contributor in Afghanistan provides its donors with the ability to undertake large-scale 
projects that are beyond the scope of most donors. However, the lack of a unified EU 
development strategy acts as a severe constraint on this potential. Another limiting factor 
stems from the fact that EU donor activities are driven, in large part, by the Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy (ANDS).238   
Assisting the Afghans in pursuing their defined development and poverty 
reduction strategy is sensible. It is the model accepted by donors, it provides ownership to 
the Afghans, and it builds the Afghan capacity to eventually govern independently of 
foreign assistance. Further adding to the logic of this design is the fact that the ANDS is a 
comprehensive strategy that was created in close cooperation with international donors 
and experts. However, adherence to the ANDS without qualification could limit the 
potential of the EU donors to achieve the greatest possible positive effects. As discussed 
in Chapter II, the “bottom-up” mechanisms, the Provincial Development Plans (PDPs), 
that are supposed to achieve the strategic objectives of the “top-down” designed ANDS 
are unable to fully address its overarching objectives in their current form. The 
disconnect between the ANDS and the PDPs represents a significant challenge to donors. 
The EU donors in particular, through strict adherence to the ANDS mechanisms, are 
missing critical opportunities to harness existing development opportunities in 
Afghanistan that could dramatically reduce poverty in the long-term through sustainable 
economic growth.   
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The EU donors are in an excellent position to address the disconnect between the 
ANDS and the PDPs by leveraging large-scale projects that harness Afghanistan’s natural 
resources as well as potential and existing value chains.239 This can be accomplished 
with additional emphasis in certain ANDS sectors such as Economic Governance and 
Private Sector Development, Infrastructure and Natural Resources, and, to a lesser extent, 
the Agricultural and Rural Development sector pillars.240 To capitalize on the resources 
and value chains in the areas of Afghanistan where EU donors operate, these donors 
could integrate regional planning themes into their strategies that address large-scale 
projects.241 Short-term direct poverty reduction projects and locally defined needs should 
not be neglected, but it is also crucial to “ensure that the links between national and local 
level planning are developed effectively,” according to the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC).242 If poverty reduction is the ultimate goal, long-term and sustainable economic 
growth through regional planning should be a key part of EU donors’ development 
strategies. 
This chapter investigates the hypothesis that EU donors are in an excellent 
position to leverage value chains in Afghanistan that could generate sustainable economic 
growth, but are not doing so. The key questions addressed are: How can EU donors 
implement regional development strategies to increase EU aid effectiveness and create 
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sustainable economic growth in Afghanistan? What are the advantages of regional 
strategies, and how can EU donors employ them for best effect?   
This chapter identifies the importance of economic growth to effective 
development strategies and examines how regional strategies can generate sustainable 
economic growth. An analysis of the ANDS determines to what extent the Afghan 
government subscribes to the published conventional wisdom concerning economic 
growth policies. This is followed by an examination of the current activities of EU donors 
to determine to what degree their strategies are aligned with the stated elements of 
effective development strategies. Potential methods for the EU to adjust its current 
strategy, considering available natural resources and value chains, are examined using the 
“Nangarhar Inc” case study, followed by a discussion of the challenges involved in their 
implementation. 
B. A BETTER WAY: THE CASE FOR INTEGRATING REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
1. What Does an Ideal Development Strategy Look Like? 
It is important to emphasize that the ultimate goal of long-term sustainable 
economic growth in Afghanistan is to reduce the poverty of the people of Afghanistan, 
and this should not be regarded as an end in itself. Although short term projects for 
security effects can be useful, a distinction must be drawn, according to the ISAF 
Commander, General Stanley McChrystal, in August 2009: “Economic support to 
counterinsurgency is distinct from and cannot substitute for the longer-term development 
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in the ANDS, and the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Strategies for 
Sustainable Development states that poverty reduction is an imperative in developing 
countries.244 
EU donors do not plan their Afghanistan development strategies in a vacuum. A 
wealth of information and lessons learned is available to drafters of development 
strategies. However, this does not mean that “best practices” are followed, or even that 
there is agreement among donors about what the “best development practices” are in 
Afghanistan. For example, in a 2008 report, the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DfID) stated that  
Development agencies need to come to international agreements among 
themselves about what constitutes good practice for post-war 
reconstruction and development in fragile states, especially when they are 
working in partnership with the military. The development community 
needs a body of agreed principles every bit as much as the military.245  
To define the most effective unified EU development strategy, the EU donors 
could follow the principles recommended by the OECD, which boasts 19 European 
Union member states as contributing members.246 The OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) consults on development methods and assists in the coordination of 
donor resources for its members. The DAC also “seek[s]…new ways of doing business to 
increase not only the quantity, but also the quality of aid—in other words, to improve aid 
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effectiveness.”247 The latter goal represents a key tenet of this chapter’s analysis. As 16 
EU member states are members of the DAC, including the five largest member state 
donors in Afghanistan (Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom), this body undoubtedly influences the design of EU donors’ strategies in 
Afghanistan. For example, DfID has asserted that “The OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) is the key forum for agreeing best practice within the donor 
community.”248 
Figure 18, from the DAC’s Strategies for Sustainable Development, indicates that 
economic objectives should be considered relative to environmental and social 
objectives. 
  
Figure 18. The Dimensions of Sustainable Development249 
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This is a key indicator of the importance of economic planning considerations in a 
viable development strategy. Further indicating the connection between economic growth 
and effective poverty reduction in Afghanistan is Figure 19, which outlines the eight 
sector pillars of the ANDS. 
 
Figure 19. Structure of the ANDS250 
Sub-pillars that affect economic growth occupy a prominent place in the overall 
ANDS. The importance of this theme is echoed in the European Council’s statement 
regarding sustainable development that “in the long term, economic growth, social 
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cohesion, and environmental protection must go hand in hand.”251 Although 
development strategies in developing countries must take into account the circumstances 
of the environment, it is clear that the fundamentals of these strategies should include a 
strong emphasis on economic growth. 
A 2004 World Bank report provides useful insights into the importance of 
economic development in Afghanistan. First, it affirms that “robust, sustained economic 
growth is essential for Afghanistan to secure peace and improve human development.” 
Second, this report notes that economic growth affects security and state building, creates 
revenue, stabilizes the political system, provides alternatives to poppy production, and 
contributes to poverty reduction. Third, it points out that “the key development challenge 
for Afghanistan is to put in place the institutions, policies, and services that will generate 
sustained, broad-based economic growth.”252 Echoing these principles is a January 2010 
U.S. policy document that identifies the importance of short-term assistance for 
counterinsurgency effects in Afghanistan but also observes that “Long-term 
reconstruction efforts aim to provide a foundation for sustainable economic growth.”253 
Finally, the need to establish the conditions for the private sector to flourish is 
inextricably linked to sustainable economic growth in Afghanistan. The World Bank 
noted that “the Afghan private sector is at the heart of the country’s growth prospects and 
strategy,” and that the Afghan government has been “pursuing pro-private sector 
policies.”254 This is also apparent in Article 10 of the Afghan Constitution, which 
declares that “The state encourages and protects private capital investments and 
enterprises based on the market economy.”255 
                                                 
251  European Commission, “A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development,” 2002. 
http://ec.europa.eu/sustainable/docs/strategy2001_en.pdf (accessed Feburary 15, 2010). 21. The sustainable 
development strategies are primarily focused on achieving EU objectives, but the document also notes the 
importance of addressing global development challenges. The quoted text is bolded as it is in the original 
document.  
252 World Bank, “A Country Economic Report,” 20. 
253 United States. Department of State, “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,” 
January 2010. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf (accessed January 24, 2010). 1. 
254 World Bank, “Country Economic Report,” xv. 
255 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Supreme Court of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan, 
January 3, 2004. http://www.supremecourt.gov.af/PDFiles/constitution2004_english.pdf (accessed 
December 6, 2009). Article 10.  
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Clearly, economic growth must play a major role in an effective and sustainable 
development strategy in Afghanistan. However, in analyzing the effectiveness of donor 
strategies in Afghanistan, it is important to ask: Is economic growth given the consider-
ation it deserves in Afghanistan by the EU donors who use the ANDS as a guide? Do the 
PDPs provide the appropriate emphasis on economic growth in order to achieve the 
ANDS goals of poverty reduction? 
2. The Case for Sustainable Economic Development Through Regional 
Planning 
Although numerous economic value chains exist in Afghanistan, they are not 
leveraged to their full potential. Many of these value chains span multiple provinces in 
Afghanistan. This is important when considering that the mechanism within the ANDS 
designed to accomplish its strategic goals is the Provincial Development Plan (PDP). 
Since the 34 PDPs primarily incorporate the projects that are submitted by the Afghan 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) through the Districts to the Provincial 
Development Councils, they do not consider value chains that span multiple provinces. 
The only Afghan bodies that have the scope to address value chains of this magnitude are 
the ministries, which still lack the capacity to effectively harness the potential of these 
resources. Certain members of the donor community have the ability to help bridge the 
disconnect between the ANDS and the PDPs, notably the United States and the European 
Union, through the use of regional development strategies256 that address these 
possibilities. 
The key stakeholders within the Afghan government understand the value of 
focusing donor aid on areas with potential for long-term, sustainable economic growth. 
The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, stated in his September 2009 report that the 
Afghan government has begun “focusing on linked strategies to unlock the potential of  
 
 
                                                 
256 The term “regional strategies” refers to development strategies that address multi-province areas 
within the borders of Afghanistan in order to harness natural resources that cross provincial boundaries. 
These are separate from international regional strategies in southern and central Asia, such as the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan regional strategy outlined in the 2010 Department of State document. 
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Afghanistan’s economic centres of growth, in particular agriculture, mineral resources 
and human development,” and that donors should “concentrate where possible on 
economic and employment generation.”257 
The United States is beginning to incorporate these themes in its development 
strategy. Its “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,” published in 
January 2010, holds that U.S. “[s]upport for regional economic integration will help 
accelerate economic renewal.” Moreover, it states that the United States intends to focus 
“primarily on population centers and key economic corridors” with other efforts in 
support of “regional economic integration” (Afghanistan and Pakistan in this context). 
Another identified U.S. effort provides assistance to entrepreneurs in developing five 
“core” value chains: “rugs, grapes, gems, marble, and cashmere.” To support key 
infrastructure and financial sector development in support of these and other “Economic 
Foundation” efforts, the United States has set aside $2.5 billion in available resources.258 
This marks a notable shift in the United States’ development strategy—to embrace 
economic development through regional strategies by leveraging value chains with great 
potential in Afghanistan. For the largest donor in Afghanistan, the decision to address 
projects beyond the reach of most donors is appropriate. These themes are also relevant 
to EU donors because they collectively constitute the second-largest aid contributor. 
Regional strategies encompass large-scale solutions that could significantly 
reduce poverty in a way that short-term projects cannot. To take this idea to the extreme, 
it could be considered that if the total donor aid for Afghanistan in 2009 were distributed 
in cash equally to each Afghan, every individual would receive about $170.259 This 
would certainly reduce the poverty of the Afghans in the short term, but it would not 
                                                 
257 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its 
Implications for International Peace and Security,” Afghanistan Conflict Monitor – Key Documents. 
September 22, 2009. http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/UNSC_S2009475.pdf (accessed November 20, 
2009). 10–11. 
258 Department of State, “Regional Stabilization Strategy,” 18–19. 
259 International Monetary Fund, “First Annual Report,” 20; United States. Central Intelligence 
Agency, World Factbook – Afghanistan “People,” January 26, 2010. https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed February 14, 2010). The IMF report gives Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) at $4.89 billion based on a Ministry of Finance donor review. The CIA 
World Factbook gives a July 2009 population estimate of Afghanistan at 28,395,716. 
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create the conditions necessary to generate long-term sustainable economic growth. The 
National Solidarity Program (NSP) moves a step forward and asks over 22,000 
Community Development Councils to propose projects within their community that will 
alleviate poverty.260 However, while “people-centered” and community-based inputs are 
important principles in development strategies,261 a wider scope of vision is also needed 
to address sustainable growth prospects.  
“People-centered” and sustainable economic growth principles need not be 
mutually exclusive themes in viable development programs. This thesis does not argue 
that the NSP and its related projects are irrelevant or that the NSP should be discarded. It 
assesses the hypothesis that long-term projects designed to generate sustainable economic 
growth have been neglected in favor of an overemphasis on short-term projects, creating 
an imbalance. Matt Waldman aptly summarizes this phenomenon in the context of aid 
that is driven by the objectives of the donor agency or nation: 
This has resulted in projects which are designed rapidly to deliver visible 
results. Whilst there is no doubt that aid is required to address short-term, 
especially humanitarian, challenges, to some extent this has come at the 
expense of Afghan participation, and sustainable poverty reduction and 
capacity-building objectives.262 
Especially in the Agricultural and Rural Development, Economic Governance and 
Private Sector Development, and Infrastructure and Natural Resources sector pillars, EU 
donors should consider the economic development projects they pursue in terms of 
“return on investment.” That is, if the project directly reduces poverty and improves the 
                                                 
260 European Commission, “Afghanistan: State of Play January 2010,” European Commission 
External Cooperation Programmes. February 25, 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/ 
documents/state_of_play_afg_2010-jan.pdf (accessed February 25, 2010). 5. The document notes 22,104 
“Communities mobilized”  as of 19 March 2009.  
261 OECD, Strategies for Sustainable Development, 27. 
262 Matt Waldman, “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” ACBAR Advocacy Series. 
March 2008. http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20-
(25%20Mar%2008).pdf (accessed January 14, 2010) 10; See also Nixon, “Aiding the State?” 1, 4, 10. 
Waldman and Nixon are primarily concerned with what they describe as ill-conceived drivers of these 
projects. However, their interpretation of the effects of short-term projects is relevant. Nixon uses the 
framework of “statebuilding” to identify the ineffectiveness of these types of projects in achieving holistic 
goals.  
 100
lives of Afghans, it is a good project. If the project promotes sustainable economic 
growth that could provide significant long-term poverty reduction effects, it is an even 
better project and, therefore, deserving of prioritized support. 
3. The ANDS and Sustainable Economic Growth Through Regional 
Strategies 
Does the ANDS promote economic development as a means to achieve poverty 
reduction? Analysis shows that it does. The 2006 Afghanistan Compact stated: “The 
Afghan government with the support of the international community will pursue high 
rates of sustainable economic growth with the aim of reducing hunger, poverty and 
unemployment.”263 A GIRoA statement from the Interim ANDS (I-ANDS) drafted in the 
same year is also telling: “Ultimately, we want to move beyond dependence upon 
international aid and build a thriving, legal, private sector-led economy that reduces 
poverty and enables all Afghans to live in dignity.” This tenet is also echoed in the 
ANDS.264 The Afghan government understands that direct poverty reduction projects are 
only short-term solutions. The long-term solution is to build a thriving economy that 
reduces poverty on a durable basis. 
However, the PDPs are not designed to harness the power of large-scale economic 
value chains that could generate sustainable economic growth. As discussed in Chapter 
II, the PDPs primarily represent consolidated lists of poverty reduction projects proposed 
by local communities. Furthermore, the provinces had begun the formulation of the PDPs 
before the launch of the sub-national consultations and the elaboration of the ANDS. As a 
result, the majority of the “PDPs were not aligned with the Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) and the process was not linked to national level 
                                                 
263 “The Afghanistan Compact,” NATO – Afghanistan Compact, 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/-afghanistan_compact.pdf (accessed October 18, 2009). 4. 
264 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” January 
2006. 9. The ANDS (published in 2008) states that “dependence on foreign assistance and the opium 
economy will not be sustainable in the medium-term. A shift to private sector led economic growth is 
crucial.” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” 40. 
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development planning processes.”265 This break in linkage is also highlighted in the 
ANDS itself. Figure 20, taken from the ANDS, shows that only three of the 34 Afghan 
provinces listed employment as a priority, and no themes from the Economic Governance 
and Private Sector Development pillar are easily recognizable. Secondary and tertiary 
rankings resulted in similar indicators of emphasis.266 
 
Figure 20. Sectors/Pillars and the Number of Provinces in Which They Are an 
Official Priority267 
The August 2008 Kushk Robat Sangi District Development Plan (DDP) displays 
a similar lack of emphasis on long-term economic development projects. Unsurprisingly, 
because the needs of the Afghans within this community are pressing and require 
attention in the near term, the project list primarily consists of roads, schools, wells, 
clinics, agricultural projects and retaining walls. Tellingly, the “Economic Governance 
and Private Sector Development” sector pillar is not represented and few of the projects 
under other listed sector pillars can be associated with economic development, either by 
                                                 
265 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Kunar Province Provincial Development Plan,” August 5 to 
August 15, 2007. 7; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “The Provincial Development Plan of Nangarhar 
Province,” (translated by Nadir Babck) August 5 to August 15, 2007. 10. The Nangarhar document clarifies 
that the PDPs were created with no guidance from the central ministries and that they were not aligned with 
the ministerial strategies (10). 
266 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” 23–24. 
267 From Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” 23. There 
is no explanation for why 35 provinces are represented in the table when the ANDS notes numerous times 
that Afghanistan has 34 provinces. A possible explanation is that some maps of Afghanistan split one or 
more provinces into two separate areas and the drafters of the ANDS may have received data from an 
additional “province.” 
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design or intent.268 The Kushk Robat Sangi District Development Plan is representative 
of the themes prevalent in the DDPs across Afghanistan. 
These examples are not consistent with the statement noted in a 2004 World Bank 
report that “The government views private sector-led development as the key to 
Afghanistan’s longer-term economic development and poverty reduction.”269 However, 
these examples provide further insight into the underlying problem. The cause of this 
problem is the break in the link between the strategic goals of the ANDS, which 
emphasize sustainable economic development, and the PDPs, which are the locally-
driven mechanisms used to attain those goals. The DAC’s Strategies for Sustainable 
Development guide maintains that development strategies “need to consider which issues 
can only be addressed at a national and central level, and which can be addressed more 
locally,”270 and also “need to consider which mechanisms can achieve this balance 
between top-down and bottom-up approaches.”271 
This analysis presents a pressing case for the incorporation of regional planning 
themes into the Provincial Development Plans to correct an imbalance that neglects 
Afghanistan’s long-term economic growth prospects. The problem can be summed up as 
follows: international experts note the importance of economic growth fueled by the 
private sector for a development strategy aimed at poverty reduction. The Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) understands these concepts and promotes 
their pursuit in its national strategy. The ANDS, however, lacks the mechanisms 
necessary to pursue those goals to their fullest potential. The impressive capabilities of 
the EU donors could address this challenge with the pursuit of regional development 
strategies that contribute to long-term sustainable economic growth, while providing an 
example to the Afghans to bridge the gap between the ANDS and PDPs. The question 
that remains is: “How could the EU most effectively pursue this plan?” 
                                                 
268 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development: National 
Area Based Development Programme,” District Development Plan: List of Project Ideas in English. 2006. 
http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/DDP-Herat.htm (accessed February 14, 2010). 
269 World Bank, “Country Economic Report,” 65. 
270 OECD, “Sustainable Development,” 41. 
271 Ibid., 42. “Mechanisms” is italicized as it is in the original document. 
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C. EU DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
This CSP and the accompanying indicative programmes primarily aim to 
create the conditions for sustainable development and poverty 
reduction…In line with this approach, the sectors set out in this CSP are 
not all explicitly directed at progress toward the MDGs but rather 
prioritize actions that will enable sustainable poverty reduction in the 
medium to long run.272 
European Commission, 2007 
1. Current EU Activities   
The EU donors are not currently focused on large-scale projects with long-term 
economic growth potential. The stated European Commission priorities in 2007–2013 
include three focus areas (rural development, governance, and health) and three non-
focus areas (social protection, mine action and regional cooperation) that address ANDS 
concerns.273 According to the European Commission’s 2009 “Blue Book,” 47% of total 
EU aid (including that from the member states) goes to the “Governance, Rule of Law 
and Security” sectors. About 20% is directed toward the Agriculture and Rural 
Development sector pillar for “community development and public infrastructure at 
district and village levels,” which is primarily administered by the National Solidarity 
Program. The “education, health, and social protection” sector pillars each enjoy about 
19% of the EU donor aid. Yet, private sector development and “construction of major 
infrastructure” fall last at about 12% of EU donor aid (see Figure 21).274 
                                                 
272 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007–2013,” 
Europa – External Relations. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/csp/07_13_en.pdf 
(accessed July 28, 2009). 3. Country Strategy Paper (CSP); Millenium Development Goals (MDG). 
273 European Commission, “Afghanistan: State of Play January 2009,” 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/-documents/afgh_state_of_play_january_09_en.pdf (accessed 
October 18, 2009). 2. In this context, “regional cooperation” refers to Afghanistan’s neighbors.  
274 European Commission, EU Blue Book 2009: The EU and Afghanistan, 
http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/downloadable_documents/EUBlueBookAfg_2009.pdf (accessed 
November 20, 2009). 5. 
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Figure 21. Estimated EU Average Annual Developmental Assistance for  
Afghanistan According to ANDS Sector Pillars (in millions of euro/year).275 
The Council of the European Union and the European Commission documents 
identify the need for sustainable economic growth, but the ability of the EU donors to 
address that goal is fettered by the disconnect between the ANDS and the PDPs. A 
statement issued by the Council of the European Union in October 2009 stated that 
further initiatives should support the “community-based structures” of the NSP. 
Additionally, although it asserted that the development strategy should enable the 
“Afghan private sector to become the engine for agricultural growth and job creation,” 
the method that the Council of the European Union suggested to achieve this goal was 
through “[r]ural micro-credit schemes” as well as the NSP.276 Although micro-credit 
schemes are certainly beneficial, the trend of favoring the pursuit of strategic visions 
through local strategies is again apparent. 
 
                                                 
275 This figure is based on the information in European Commission, “Blue Book 2009,” 12. 
276 Council of the European Union, Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14064.en09.pdf (accessed December 6, 2009). 9, 15. 
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Figure 21 shows the relative lack of emphasis by the EU donors on the “Infra-
structure and Natural Resources” and “Economic and Private Sector Development” sector 
pillars, especially given that a large portion of “ARTF unpreferenced” funding goes to the 
NSP and its associated local programs. (As previously noted, ARTF stands for the 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.) The EU donors do not seem to place the 
emphasis on sustainable economic growth and private sector development that is called 
for by the Afghan government, the OECD’s DAC, the World Bank, and other relevant 
stakeholders.  
Given the empirical evidence in recent years that small-scale poverty reduction 
programs have not generated sustainable economic growth in Afghanistan, it is not 
difficult to understand why the United States has changed its approach. Although a 
comprehensive strategy remains in place, the United States is beginning to flex its 
“development muscle” by addressing large-scale critical infrastructure with great 
potential for economic growth: “Our emphasis is on major energy infrastructure rehab-
ilitation (e.g., the Kajaki Dam, Darunta Dam, and Sheberghan gas generation plant),” and 
on value chains such as the “mines to market value chain.”277 The EU’s relative lack of 
emphasis on sustainable economic growth in relation to its stated importance establishes 
a pressing case for the EU to make adjustments to its development strategy.  
2. What Is Unique About the EU That It Can Leverage? 
a. Strength in Numbers  
Collectively, the EU donors have the capability to address critical 
infrastructure projects on a scale that is impossible for other donors (besides the United 
States) to manage due to their relatively smaller budgets. However, doing so would 
require strategy adjustments as well as a dramatic increase in EU donor coordination. As 
noted in Chapter II, the EU donors combined represent the second largest donor in 
Afghanistan after the United States. This represents a powerful potential tool.  
                                                 
277 United States. Department of State, “Regional Stabilization Strategy,” 18, 19. 
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There are a wide variety of appropriate development and reconstruction 
projects in Afghanistan. These range from a relatively inexpensive well for a rural area to 
the approximately $8 billion that the Chinese are investing to mine the Aynak copper 
deposit in Logar Province.278 The potential impact of large-scale projects such as the 
Anyak copper mine is staggering. According to a 2009 report by James R. Yeager et al., 
International experts estimate that Aynak royalty revenues could generate 
more than $200 million annually for Afghan budget funds over the next 30 
years. In a country where the national budget in 2008 was $650 million, 
this would have significant impact...Upwards of 1500 direct mine jobs are 
estimated to be generated out of the Aynak work; indirect employment 
that includes transport, mine product processing, production of spare parts, 
and community and mine services could be up to 30,000 new jobs 
depending on the amount of ancillary activity that is supported by the 
developing company.279 
The effects of this project can be measured not only in terms of 
sustainable economic growth, but also by other factors such as job creation and security. 
Richard Holbrooke noted in February 2010 that the jobs created from a recent emphasis 
on agribusiness would “help deny the Taliban a pool of alienated, unemployed youths 
who go out and get paid to shoot.”280 (This prospect is also a counter to those who assert 
that security must come before development.) The Anyak Copper Deposit is only one of 
many potential large-scale value chains in Afghanistan. However, most donors simply do 
not have the ability to address these projects. The EU could do so.  
                                                 
278 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Embassy of Afghanistan: Washington D.C., Anyak Copper 
Mine Predicted to Create 8,000 Direct jobs Once Landmines are Cleared, August 27, 2009. 
http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/AYNAKCOPPERMINE.html (accessed January 25, 2010). 
279 James R. Yeager et al., “The Aynak Copper Tender: Implications for Afghanistan and the West,” 
Diversity Spectrum Corporation. November 9, 2009. http://www.diversityspectrum.com/-
index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=5311 (accessed January 29, 2010). 2–3; Embassy of 
Afghanistan, Anyak Copper Mine. The Embassy of Afghanistan’s report estimates that 8,000 direct jobs 
will be created as a result of the agreement. Besides mining activities, the Chinese company is building 
“roads, hospitals, schools, mosques, and water sources” in the surrounding area according to Yeager et al.  
280 United States. Department of State, Briefing on Recent Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, February 
3, 2010. http://www.state.gov/s/special_rep_afghanistan_pakistan/2010/136445.htm (accessed February 20, 
2010). 
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b. What Potential Resources Are Prevalent in the Areas in Which 
the EU Donors are Working? 
To determine how best to decide what natural resources and value chains 
the EU donors could leverage, it is useful to compare the areas in which the EU donors 
are currently active and have established operating infrastructure with the geographic 
locations of known and estimated natural resources. Since member states of the EU also 
lead ten Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, an analysis of the areas 
where these PRTs operate are also indicated.  
 
Figure 22. Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams Led by European Union 
Member States 
Although the European Union development agencies are active throughout 
the entire country, the ten PRTs led by the member states of the EU are focused in RC-
North, West, and South (see Figure 22). The geographic dispersal of EU donor funds also 
follows this general pattern, although the CSP stated the European Commission’s (EC) 
intent to increase its emphasis on the “East and North-Eastern provinces” in 2007–
2010.281  
                                                 
281 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper,” 19. 
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Figure 23. Geographic Distribution of Funds Committed (USD): European 
Commission and Member States. 2001–2009282 
 
Figure 24. Geographic Distribution of Funds Committed (USD): European 
Commission. 2001–2009283 
                                                 
282 After Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Development Assistance Database—Afghanistan, 
http://dadafghanistan.gov.af/ (accessed January 24, 2010). The information used to construct Figures 22–24 
was derived from this database maintained by the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MoF). 
283 After Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Development Assistance Database. 
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Figure 25. Geographic Distribution of Funds Committed (USD): Six Highest 
Contributing EU Member States. 2001–2009284 
Numerous potential value chains (or systems of related natural resources 
and service-based industries with the potential to flourish together) exist within the 
geographic areas in which the EU donors operate. Additionally, experts have identified 
the provinces of Herat, Kandahar, Balkh, and Nangarhar as potential economic engines 
with the ability to multiply effects throughout their respective regions.285 As Sweden 
leads a PRT in Balkh and Italy’s PRT operates in Herat, these two EU member states are 
in a position to assist in leveraging these economic engines. This would also require 
increased coordination with ISAF, as discussed in Chapter III.  
                                                 
284 After Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Development Assistance Database. The six donors are 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
285 U.S. Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan Reconstruction Group analysis, April 2008. See also Clive 
Mitchell and Antony Benham, "Afghanistan: Revival & Redevelopment," British Geological Society. June 
2008. http://www.bgs.ac.uk/AfghanMinerals/docs/IndustrialMineralsFinalArticle.pdf (accessed February 
14, 2010). 54. The authors characterize Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Jalalabad as “urban centres.” 
(The last two are the major urban areas in the provinces of Balkh and Nangarhar, respectively.) See also a 
2008 World Bank investment climate survey in Afghanistan which focused on five urban areas: Kabul and 
the four potential “regional economic engines” noted above. World Bank, “The Afghanistan Investment 
Climate in 2008,” Afghanistan: Publications and Reports. November 2009. 2. 
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Figure 26. Afghanistan’s Potential Regional Economic Engines286 
(1) Mineral Resources. Afghanistan’s mineral wealth represents a 
noteworthy potential source of economic growth—not only for its abundance, but also 
due to Afghanistan’s geographic location in Asia. According to Clive Mitchell and 
Antony Benham, researchers for the British Geological Survey, Afghanistan is well 
situated to export these mineral resources to “rapidly growing markets in China, the 
Indian sub-continent and the Persian Gulf.” They further note that the ongoing post-






                                                 
286 U.S. Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan Reconstruction Group analysis, April 2008; after United 
Nations, United Nations Cartographic Section – Afghanistan, http://www.un.org/Depts/-
Cartographic/map/profile/afghanis.pdf (accessed December 6, 2009).  








Figure 27. Map of Ore Deposits and Occurrences of Ferrous Metals and Fuel 
Minerals of Afghanistan288 
                                                 
288 United Kingdom. British Geological Survey, “Map of Ore Deposits and Occurrences of Ferrous 
Metals and Fuel Minerals of Afghanistan,” British Geological Survey. 
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/downloads/start.cfm?id=950 (accessed January 29, 2010). 
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Figure 28. Assessment of Known and Possible Mineral Deposits in Afghanistan289 
There are a large variety of natural resource value chains available 
for the EU donors to address. In 2007, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
determined that significant deposits of metals, industrial minerals, and building materials 
are present in Afghanistan. 
Estimates of known and undiscovered copper resources total nearly 60 
million metric tons of copper. Resources of iron in known deposits are 
more than 2,200 million metric tons of iron ore. Twenty mineralized areas 
were identified that merit further study and may contain resources 
amenable to rapid development.290 
                                                 
289 United States. United States Geological Survey, “Factsheet: Preliminary Assessment of Non-Fuel 
Mineral Resources of Afghanistan, 2007,” October 2007. http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2007/3063/ (accessed 
January 29, 2010). 1. “Map of Afghanistan showing mineralized areas recommended for further study 
(rectangular areas), known non-fuel mineral deposits and prospects (small dots), and selected mineral 
deposits for which resources have been published in the past (various symbols).” 
290 USGS, “Non-Fuel Mineral Resources,” 1.  
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The “Afghanistan Geological Survey and the British Geological 
Survey” estimated that the “world-class Hajigak iron deposit” contains 1.8 billion tons of 
iron ore.291 The CIA’s World Factbook page on Afghanistan identifies proven resoures of  
49.55 billion cubic meters of natural gas.292 A 2005 USGS report stated that Afghanistan 
has moderate to potentially abundant coal resources,293 and a 1986 “Afghanistan Country 
Study” noted that “The country’s overall coal reserves were estimated to be about 400 
million tons in 1975.”294  
 
Figure 29. Distribution of Major Coal-Bearing Rocks in Afghanistan295 
 
 
                                                 
291 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Request for Expression of Interest Hajigak Iron Deposit,” 
Ministry of Mines. http://mom.gov.af/uploads/files/English/Hajigak_Request_for_Expression_of_Interest_-
022309_approved%5B2%5D.pdf (accessed January 29, 2010). 1; USGS, “Non-Fuel Mineral Resources,” 
1. The USGS report estimates that there are 2.26 billion tons of iron ore at Hajigak.  
292 United States. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook – Afghanistan “Economy,” The 
estimate date was January 1, 2009. 
293 United States. United States Geological Survey, “Assessing the Coal Resources of Afghanistan,” 
USGS. June 2005. http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2005/3073/2005-3073.pdf (accessed February 14, 2010). 1. 
294 Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins (eds.), “Afghanistan Country Study,” The American 
University. http://www.gl.iit.edu./govdocs/afghanistan/Afghanistan-Chapter2.pdf (accessed February 14, 
2010). 195.  
295 From USGS, “Coal Resources of Afghanistan,” 2. 
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Significant petroleum resources exist in the northern areas of 
Afghanistan within the Afghan-Tajik basin and the Amu Darya basin (see Figure 30). 
Both the coal-bearing rock deposits and the petroleum resources in Afghanistan occur 
within areas in which EU donors are active. 
 
 
Figure 30. Satellite Image of Northern Afghanistan296 
Figure 31 identifies the significant mineral resource deposits in 
Afghanistan in relation to the geographic focus areas of EU donors as well as the 
provinces with EU member state-led PRTs. This illustrates the potential for the EU 
donors to assist the Afghan government in harnessing these natural resources in areas in 
which EU donors already operate and have established infrastructure.   
 
                                                 
296 After United States. United States Geological Survey, “Assessment of Undiscovered Petroleum 
Resources of Northern Afghanistan, 2006,” USGS. March 2006. http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3031/ 





Figure 31. Significant Unrealized Mineral Resource Estimates in Afghanistan in EU 
Donor Focus Areas297 
                                                 
297 After USGS, “Non-Fuel Mineral Resources,” 2–4; Mitchell and Benham, “Revival & 
Redevelopment,” 55, 57–59; USGS, “Undiscovered Petroleum Resources,” 2. The USGS derived data for 
“Known Resource Estimates” from Sh. Abdullah et al., “Mineral Resources of  Afghanistan,” (2nd Ed.): 
Kabul. 1977. 
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The potential of Afghanistan’s mineral resources has not been lost 
on the GIRoA. The ANDS states that “Mining will play a major role in achieving the 
high rates of economic growth and increased government revenues envisioned in the 
ANDS.”298 In a 2009 “Request for Interest” to develop the Hajigak Iron Deposit, the 
Afghanistan Ministry of Mines (MoM) emphasized that “natural resources are a priority 
for the economic development of Afghanistan.”299 The First Annual Progress Report on 
the ANDS further states: “The ANDS Mining Sector Strategy aims to establish 
Afghanistan as an attractive destination for investment in…mineral resources. The 
intention is to encourage legitimate private investment for exploration of mining 
resources in order to substantially increase government revenues.”300 This is a promising 
strategy given the historical trends in the four developing countries considered in Figure 
32.  
 
Figure 32. Examples of National Mining Sector Reforms and Their Effects on 
Economic Growth301 
The ANDS predicts similar possible benefits for Afghanistan if the 
Mining Sector strategy is pursued, including significant increases in production, 
additional value added to the Afghan government, jobs, and positive export balances.302  
                                                 
298 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” 111. 
299 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Hajigak Iron Deposit,” 1. 
300 International Monetary Fund, “First Annual Report,” 36. 
301 From Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” 109. 
302 World Bank, Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan Mining as a Source of Growth, March 
2004. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/03/26/-
000160016_20040326111059/Rendered/PDF/282310AF.pdf (accessed February 15, 2010). 1–2. The report 
“estimates that the gross annual market value of solid minerals produced could increase from the estimated 
U.S.$60 million currently to US $253 million per annum by 2008…The sector could generate: value added 
of U.S. $108 million yearly, royalties and other taxes of US $18 million yearly, nearly 7,500 new jobs, 
[and] a positive export balance of US $66 million.” 
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(2) Value Chains. Analysis shows that the natural resources and 
potential economic value chains in Afghanistan span areas that extend beyond the borders 
of the provinces. Leveraging these interrelated natural resources within a construct such 
as the “mines to market” value chain could greatly contribute to sustainable economic 
growth in Afghanistan.303 The U.S. government has identified “rugs, grapes, gems, 
marble, and Cashmere” as existing and potential value chains in Afghanistan.304 Another 
possibility is the timber value chain in Afghanistan, which operates well below its full 
potential due, in part, to an illegal timber trade network. Given the proper assistance, the 
Afghan government could recapture these value chains as part of the licit economy – 
providing revenue as well as economic growth. Cement, geothermal, and hydroelectric 
energy value chains are additional possibilities.305 
Many of these resources are being exploited on a small scale at the 
local level. Clive Mitchell and Antony Benham tell us, for example, that although 
Afghanistan has large marble deposits throughout the country with “the potential to 
supply Middle Eastern and Asian markets with an almost unlimited supply of marble,” 
the Afghans have not been able to harness this economic value chain on a large scale. 
Marble removal is done with explosives, which fracture the stone and reduce its value. 
The “rough-hewn” blocks are exported to Pakistan for finishing and polishing due to lack 
of electricity, proper tools, and trained workers within Afghanistan.306 If marble and 
other resources could be harnessed on a large scale, the economic benefits for 
Afghanistan could be considerable. As noted, the United States is investigating how best 
to leverage these value chains from producer to consumer in order to maximize economic 
growth in Afghanistan. As the second largest donor, the EU could undertake similar 
                                                 
303 United States. Department of State, “Regional Stabilization Strategy,” 18, 19. 
304 Ibid., 18. 
305 D.S. Saba et al., “Geothermal Energy in Afghanistan: Prospects and Potential,” Center on 
International Cooperation. February 2004. http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/pdf/Geothermal.pdf (accessed 
February 15, 2010). 2; Clive Mitchell and Antony Benham, "Afghanistan: Revival & Redevelopment," 
British Geological Society. June 2008. 
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/AfghanMinerals/docs/IndustrialMineralsFinalArticle.pdf (accessed February 14, 
2010). 57–58. Mitchell and Benham note that Afghanistan had the “lowest cement production in the world” 
in 2008, despite abundant raw materials, and imports most of its cement from Pakistan and Iran. 
306 Mitchell and Benham, “Revival & Redevelopment,” 55, 57.  
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measures by addressing value chains that are beyond the capability of most donors in 
Afghanistan to address. This is especially relevant to EU donors in light of the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 2009 statement that, “Given the financial 
constraints and the lack of a full enabling environment for investment, gains [in the 
ANDS Mining Strategy] are difficult to achieve.”307 The Afghan Ministry of Mines is 
attempting to find foreign investors that can leverage these natural resources. 
Considering the potential benefits, the analysis presents a strong 
case for the EU donors to engage more heavily in this area. The following statement from 
the ANDS clearly identifies the path ahead: “There is great potential for the mining 
sector. The test will be in moving quickly from the success in attracting investment in the 
Aynak copper deposits to the development and exploration of the many other mineral 
resources of the country.”308 In light of the significant requirements to address the ANDS 
Mining Strategy, the EU donors could be well-suited to assist the Afghans in leveraging 
their mineral resources to great effect.  
Of course, the benefits of harnessing Afghanistan’s natural 
resources and value chains are obvious. The more difficult question is: how could the EU 
help the Afghans to effectively harness these opportunities? Another critical question that 
must be addressed is: how could EU donors adjust their strategies without discarding the 
Provincial Development Plans, the mechanisms that are supposed to be used to achieve 
the objectives of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy? Fortunately, a model 
exists that provides potential answers to these questions.  
                                                 
307 International Monetary Fund, “First Annual Report,” 36. 
308 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” 8. 
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D. “NANGARHAR INC” CASE STUDY 
 
Figure 33. The Province of Nangarhar 
1. Background 
Daniel Korski has stated that “international aid providers—European 
development agencies in particular—should work with the UN mission in Kabul to 
develop different strategies for different parts of the country.” Korski identifies three 
distinct regions in Afghanistan: “the north, the south and east, and a central belt. Each of 
these areas requires a separate development strategy.”309 This observation displays an 
understanding that separate areas in Afghanistan have distinct needs and potentials that 
must be addressed in different ways. Regional development strategies that provide 
solutions and act as a model to link the ANDS and the PDPs are required. A United 
States interagency project called the Nangarhar Regional Development Strategy, or 
“Nangarhar Inc,” addresses just this need.  
 
                                                 
309 Korski, “Shaping Europe's Afghan Surge,” 13.  
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The plan was created in 2008 to address the numerous existing and potential value 
chains in and around Nangarhar province. Nangarhar, identified as one of Afghanistan’s 
potential regional economic engines, was poised in 2006–2007 to explode with private-
sector-led economic growth.310 A fertile agricultural region, Nangarhar and the surround-
ing areas possessed large tracts of arable land for the cultivation of crops. Some progress 
had been made in reducing poverty and sustaining the Afghans within the region through 
numerous donor-funded short-term projects such as irrigation projects and seed 
distribution plans. There were even attempts by various donors to develop the private 
sector in the province, such as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development (ASMED) program. 
Yet, the province’s burgeoning potential was constrained by a number of key factors. The 
lack of inexpensive electricity and critical infrastructure for business use (as opposed to 
residential use) prevented Nangarhar from reaching the tipping point where it could 
blossom into a flourishing and self-sustaining regional economic engine (see Figure 34). 
The infrastructure in place simply would not support the necessary local or foreign 
private sector investment needed to generate sustainable economic growth.  
 
Figure 34. Lack of Critical Energy Infrastructure in Nangarhar Province in 2007311 
                                                 
310 David Spencer, “Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Inc: A Model for Interagency Success,” Military Review 
89, no. 4 (July–August 2009): 35. 
311 U.S. Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan Reconstruction Group analysis, April 2008. The Darunta Dam, 
with a maximum output of about 11.5 MW, generated only 6–9 MW of power daily. Combined with an 
aging power distribution network, this meant that businesses had to rely on private generators to provide 
power for their needs. The high cost of fuel severely affected local business ventures. See also World Bank, 
“Investment Climate,” 10, 13–14, 31–32 for electricity effects on businesses by province. 
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Recognizing the potential of Nangarhar, in early 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Afghanistan at that time, William Wood, commissioned the creation of a regional 
development strategy. Its purpose was partly to provide the critical infrastructure needed 
to bring private and foreign investment to the region. However, key portions of the plan 
were designed to leverage the potential and existing value chains in and around the 
province of Nangarhar that could generate sustainable economic growth led by the 
private sector.  
 
Figure 35. Cover Design of the Nangarhar Regional Development Strategy  
The design of the 62-page business plan was based on a standard corporate model. 
Utilizing a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis created 
by the U.S. Embassy’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Group, the design team synthesized 
the advice and inputs from the various U.S. government agencies operating in 
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Afghanistan.312 “Nangarhar Inc” included a management and sustainability plan, and 35 
prioritized projects. The proposed project list contained detailed project descriptions 
(including purposes and predicted effects), as well as charts of required resources, 
timelines and projected cash flows.313 The projects fell into three categories: quick 
impact, near term, and long-term. One purpose of the quick-impact projects was to 
capitalize on the Nangarhar governor’s successful poppy eradication program in 2007–
2008 by providing alternative livelihood solutions. However, their most important 
purpose was to jump-start economic growth in the region. Mid and long-term categories 
addressed other concerns such as intermodal transportation solutions (road and rail 
networks, and a regional airport with an international gateway). These projects were 
necessary to address Nangarhar’s export mechanisms (or lack thereof) in light of 
Jalalabad’s potential as a regional trade and transit hub.314  
Because of Nangarhar’s compelling SWOT analysis, some of the projects were 
designed to retain and enhance the existing value chains within Nangarhar and the 
surrounding region. For example, due to the lack of available export mechanisms, up to 
an estimated 30 % of produce grown in and around Nangarhar moldered in the fields in 
spite of available markets in Dubai and elsewhere in Asia.315 To leverage these export 
opportunities, cold storage facilities with co-located power solutions were critical to 
enhancing the agribusiness economic value chain. As of 2007, Nangarhar exported a 
large percentage of its produce to businesses in Pakistan, which processed, packaged, and 




                                                 
312 Input was received from Task Force Bayonet (military forces in Nangarhar), USAID, the 
Department of State, the Nangarhar PRT, and others. The Afghan government was not involved in the 
initial stages, but was integrated soon after the launch of the project.  
313 Microlinks, “Nangarhar Inc Business Plan,” 
http://www.microlinks.org/multimedia/CivMilmedia/Nangarhar_Inc_Business_Plan.pdf (accessed 
February 26, 2010). 22–63. 
314 In this context, the term “regional” encompasses the countries around Afghanistan in central and 
southern Asia.  
315 Spencer, “Nangarhar Inc,” 37. 
 123
their original price. “Nangarhar Inc” addressed the critical infrastructure requirements for 




Figure 36. “Nangarhar Inc” Project Vision – July 2008317 
During the creation of “Nangarhar Inc,” the project design team identified power 
solutions as the most critical need. Although the lack of power for residential use in 
Afghanistan is a recognized and widespread problem, the lack of inexpensive power for 
business use is an example of a critical constraint that prevents foreign investors from 
investing in regions with otherwise significant potential for business ventures. Due to the 
high cost of the fuel required to operate generator sets (see Figure 34), 38 businesses in 
the city of Jalalabad failed within a 12-month period in 2008.318 Donor-funded 
                                                 
316 “Nangarhar Inc” also integrated relevant ongoing efforts in Nangarhar such as USAID and World 
Bank initiatives. For example, the World Bank was funding the construction of an industrial park for 
business use in Nangarhar. This type of project led the GIRoA to approve the 2009 “Industrial Park 
Development Strategy.” See World Bank, “2009 Afghanistan Economic Update,” Afghanistan. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-
1237085035526/AfghanistanEconomicUpdateOct2009.pdf (accessed February 23, 2010). 10.  
317 United States. Department of Defense, Nangarhar Inc Presentation, July 2008. The figure 
illustrates potential, not actual projects.  
318 Spencer, “Nangarhar Inc,” 37. Jalalabad is the provincial capital and largest city in Nangarhar.  
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micro-hydro projects are ubiquitous in Afghanistan but primarily act as band-aids. Larger 
solutions are required to generate sustainable economic growth, but they carry higher 
price tags.319 
One noteworthy large-scale power project was designed to harness an estimated 
700–1,100 megawatts of potential hydroelectric power in the adjacent province of Kunar 
through a series of dam systems in the Kunar river basin.320 Besides providing 
inexpensive power for business and residential use, power from this project could be 
exported to Pakistan to assist in developing the Federally Administered Tribal Area and 
Northwestern Frontier Provinces (NWFP). Most importantly, this would begin to make 
the region more attractive for foreign investors. The Afghan government correctly noted 
in the Interim ANDS (I-ANDS) that “The private sector will not invest in small and 
medium-scale industries unless it has assured power supply.”321 The approximately $3 
billion in costs that the China Metallurgical Group agreed to incur before ever breaking 
ground at Anyak are significant.322 These challenges represent a considerable deterrent 
for most Afghan and foreign investors that must be addressed. 
 
 
                                                 
319 As an example, micro-hydro projects can be afforded by nearly every donor agency in 
Afghanistan, but provide relatively small amounts of power for residential use—perhaps enough for a small 
community. A comprehensive watershed management plan with a medium-scale hydroelectric dam and 
power distribution system could cost $3–8 million, but could provide multiple districts with inexpensive 
and reliable power for both residential and business use. These projects require comprehensive strategies 
and capable donors.  
320 Spencer, “Nangarhar Inc,” 37. 
321 International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper, IMF Country Report, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2006. 15.  
322 Ron Synovitz, Afghanistan: China's Winning Bid for Copper Rights Incudes PowerPlant, 
Railroad, November 11, 2007. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp112607.shtml 
(accessed March 11, 2010); Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy,” 109; Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington, “Anyak Copper Mine Predicted to Create 8,000 
Direct Jobs Once Landmines are Cleared,” August 27, 2009. 
http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/AYNAKCOPPERMINE.-html (accessed January 25, 2010). The 
ANDS states that “The company will establish a power station with 400 megawatt capacity at a cost of over 
$400 million and will construct a town for the workers of the company. The company will also establish a 
railway route from Hairatan port in northern Afghanistan to Torkham in eastern Afghanistan.” The 
embassy article notes that the China Metallurgical Group is also providing “roads, hospitals, schools, 
mosques, and water sources.”  
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By reducing the requirement for private investors to invest heavily to simply 
ensure adequate living and working conditions for their employees, these types of 
projects will address the primary goals of the ANDS and, thereby, “ensure sustainable 
development through a private-sector-led market economy.”323 Few donors other than the 
United States and the EU donors have the capability to address these projects on the scale 
necessary to harness potential value chains, or to make these endeavors more appealing 
for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Afghan businesses.  
The “Nangarhar Inc” plan was also intended to provide a model for provinces and 
districts in RC-East to refine their development plans in a manner that considers value 
chains as opposed to simple lists of unrelated projects that are proposed by local officials 
and later assigned to ANDS sectors almost as an afterthought. 
U.S. government forces worked to build the capacity of District Development 
Assemblies and other Afghan government officials to create development plans that 
linked projects together in order to capture and enhance potential economic value chains 
(see Figure 37). When viewed and leveraged as a value chain, the effects of these 
interconnected projects can be far greater than the sum of their unrelated parts.  
                                                 







Figure 37. Example of a Potential Agribusiness Value Chain324 
                                                 
324 The diagram shows a comprehensive watershed management plan with a mid-sized dam for power 
and an associated distribution system. Irrigation and agricultural development projects increase the existing 
production of grain, leading to a mill and to a processing and packaging facility. These and the cold storage 
facilities are powered by the dam project. Roads link the projects together and provide the ability to bring 
the goods to market and export. Small business loans provide the private sector with the ability to enhance 
and maintain the value chain for sustainable economic growth. The screenshot shows a portion of a district 
within Nangarhar province and is from NASA’s “World Wind” application. This diagram is based on a 
concept sketch used by the U.S. Army’s 173d Airborne Brigade at Forward Operating Base Fenty in 2008. 
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2. “Nangarhar Inc” and the ANDS 
 
Figure 38. Relationship Between the ANDS, the PDPs, and “Nangarhar Inc”325 
As indicated in Figure 38, “Nangarhar Inc” was not designed to replace the 
ANDS or the PDPs. First, “Nangarhar Inc” did not directly address every pillar of the 
ANDS, although long-term sustainable economic growth could enable the achievement 
of the other sector pillar goals and could lead to lesser reliance on international donor aid. 
Second, “Nangarhar Inc” was intended to complement the existing mechanisms, not 
replace them. This model could provide a much-needed link between the ANDS strategic 
vision and its mechanisms, the Provincial and District Development Plans. This follows 
the design of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in “[b]uilding on existing 
strategies and processes, rather than adding additional ones.”326 It also provides a clear 
focus on the importance of economic development—by shifting emphasis to long-term 
and private sector solutions as opposed to short-term poverty reduction projects.  
 
                                                 
325 United States. Department of Defense, Nangarhar Inc Presentation, July 2008; Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, “Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” January 2006. 16. The quotes in the 
upper left of the figure are from the Interim ANDS.  
326 OECD, Strategies for Sustainable Development, 12. 
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The Provincial Development Plan of Nangarhar states that “Creating the 
conditions in which a dynamic and competitive private sector can flourish is key to 
promote economic growth, employment creation and poverty reduction.”327 Coordinating 
development plans after the model of “Nangarhar Inc,” while weaving them into the 
fabric of the Provincial Development Plans, could more effectively achieve this vision. 
E. THE EUROPEAN UNION: STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The overall strategy must be politically, not militarily driven…This 
includes focusing on longer-term sustainable projects. Right now, over 80 
percent of the projects carried out by PRTs have a value of under 
US$100,000 and are mostly quick impact projects. Quick impact projects 
quickly become quick collapse projects if there is no real economic 
development to sustain them in the long term.328  
Kai Eide, UNAMA SR-SG. February 8, 2010 
1. Possible EU Strategy Adjustments 
To follow the UNAMA SR-SG’s advice and correct the imbalance between 
small-scale short term and large-scale projects, EU donors could use the “Nangarhar Inc” 
model. Since EU member states lead PRTs in ten provinces, those member states could 
advise and assist the Afghan government officials in those provinces to adjust their PDPs 
in a manner that would address potential economic value chains. The Provincial 
Development Councils could continue to utilize the National Solidarity Program to 
integrate community poverty reduction plans, but it could also begin to integrate regional 
planning, through the central Afghan ministries, that might more effectively address the 
ANDS visions. Secondly, the European Commission and EU member states should press 
to identify the potential resources and value chains in their respective operating areas 
since the ANDS has determined that 90% of Afghanistan still requires study “despite 
promising findings.”329 
                                                 
327 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “The Provincial Development Plan of Province Nangarhar,” 
August 5–15, 2007. 26. 
328 Security & Defence Agenda, The Security Jam – Changing Mindset and Learning from the Past 
(Discussion Thread), 2010. https://www.collaborationjam.com/minijam2/jam/discussionThread.do?gt 
=true&jamId=25503&f=25743&c=35983&n=15#35983 (accessed February 8, 2010). 
329 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” 8. 
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Of course, the greatest effects would be achieved within the framework of a 
unified and coordinated EU development strategy, which would be strengthened by 
partnership with the United States through UNAMA and the Joint Coordination 
Monitoring Board (JCMB), as discussed in Chapter III.330 However, even if the EU 
donors choose not to adopt the compelling strategy adjustments identified within this 
chapter, the themes themselves could be integrated into existing EU donor programs in a 
scalable manner. Given their noted lack of practical emphasis on long-term economic 
development relative to their stated policy, EU donors could still achieve significant 
results by considering the value of current projects in terms of their “Return on 
Investment” with regard to generating sustainable economic growth and facilitating the 
expansion of the private sector.  
Another critical adjustment that must be made is to ensure that an appropriate 
proportion of projects is engaged with the purpose of developing the private sector. 
Existing EU donor programs such as the European Commission’s “Rural micro-credit 
schemes aimed at enabling the Afghan private sector to become the engine for 
agricultural growth and job creation” should be defined as “need to have” projects as 
opposed to “nice to have” endeavors.331 Conditions must also be improved to make 
Afghanistan attractive to foreign investors. The importance of this requirement is difficult 
to overstate. The DAC’s Strategies for Sustainable Development highlights that, “Given 
that the financial resources flowing to developing countries through private investment 
now dwarf official development assistance; this is a challenge that needs to be addressed 
in developing and implementing strategies for sustainable development.”332  
                                                 
330 Matt Waldman, “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” ACBAR Advocacy Series. 
March 2008. http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20-
(25%20Mar%2008).pdf (accessed January 14, 2010). 5. Working with the United States creates further 
possibilities to engage these thematic large-scale projects. Waldman professes that “Donors 
should…increase the proportion of joint analytical work from one-third to two-thirds and ensure that at 
least half of donor missions are undertaken jointly.” These ideas could enhance the ability of donors to 
leverage large-scale projects with significant potential. 
331 Council of the European Union, Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14064.en09.pdf (accessed December 6, 2009). 15. 
“Need/nice to have” are the author’s terms, not the Council’s.  
332 OECD, Strategies for Sustainable Development, 38. 
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Some of these changes will encounter resistance in the short-term. For example, 
supporting large-scale power projects for commercial applications will not be popular 
since, in some cases, this might be done at the expense of providing short-term power 
solutions for local Afghans. However, without pursuing long-term solutions that allow 
the private sector to generate sustainable economic growth, there is no viable long-term 
exit strategy for international donors.  
2. Challenges 
The political dimension is the most significant challenge associated with the EU 
donors’ adoption of regional planning themes that could generate sustainable economic 
development. Implementation of this plan would require acceptance by the institutions of 
the EU, as well as by the member states. This could encounter resistance in the manner 
described in Chapter III. However, if the EU donors do not act in a coordinated manner, 
their collective status as the second largest donor in Afghanistan will remain irrelevant, 
along with their latent ability to address the large-scale potential projects identified in this 
chapter.  
There are counterarguments to the idea of sustainable economic growth through 
regional planning that must be considered. Some members of the development 
community believe that development money should be spent equally across geographic 
regions. A statement in a 2008 DfID report is representative of this idea: “It is important 
that aid is evenly distributed in Afghanistan based on need and that the donor effort 
should be a ‘whole of Afghanistan’ effort.”333 These ideas resonate with donors and 
stakeholders in Afghanistan because all areas of the country are in need of donor aid. 
Also, the perception of unequal development efforts could lead to resentment by 
Afghans. There is even the possibility of a “peace penalty,” whereby Afghan government 
officials at various levels could accept or even promote visible instability because of a 
perception that peaceful provinces get less aid.334 This concern must be weighed 
carefully, but it should not cause the idea of leveraging economic value chains through 
                                                 
333 House of Commons, “Reconstructing Afghanistan: Government Response,” 17. 
334 Waldman, “Falling Short,” 12. Waldman did not use the term “peace penalty,” but referred to 
“perverse incentives, as insecurity is perceived as attracting more aid.” 
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regional planning to be summarily discarded. The November 2009 first annual progress 
report for the ANDS rightly pointed out that one of the requirements to implement ANDS 
programs in an area is “a stable macroeconomic environment that will retain inflation at 
low levels, [and] support sustained high rates of economic growth and increased levels of 
private investment.”335 Although all areas in Afghanistan need donor assistance, not all 
have the potential to generate sustainable economic growth, multiply effects, and cause a 
planted “seed” to blossom on its own. An ill-considered application of an “evenly-
spread” policy could be counterproductive to building sustainable, long-term economic 
growth. EU donors should consider how best to follow the spirit of this tenet, while 
ensuring that strict adherence without careful consideration does not damage 
Afghanistan’s long-term prospects.   
A counterargument that is certain to arise is the question of marginalizing the 
Afghan government. Donors as well as the Afghans are calling for more aid contributions 
to be channeled through the GIRoA to ensure their ownership of the overall plan while 
building their capacity. Afghan ownership also reduces the perception that donor 
agencies are pursuing their own goals independently of the larger Afghan strategy. These 
arguments must be carefully balanced with the GIRoA’s ability to independently 
implement these plans effectively at the outset—plans which will be difficult for even 
experienced EU development agencies to implement. The Afghans, throughout the 
ANDS, note that they still need help from the donor community. An initial EU effort, in 
coordination with the Afghans, that would later be transferred to the GIRoA, could be the 
most effective way to proceed. Analysis also shows that the policies examined in this 
chapter align with the strategies defined in the ANDS.  
Some might point to other significant challenges, such as the need to develop the 
capacity of the Afghan government at all levels, as more pressing than long-term 
economic growth projects with effects that might be measured in terms of many months 
or years. These are key tasks, especially considering that the World Bank identified weak 
government policy enforcement as the most critical challenge facing businesses in 
                                                 
335 International Monetary Fund, “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy: First Annual Report (2008/09),” November 2009. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/ cr09319.pdf (accessed December 2, 2009). 10. 
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Afghanistan.336 Yet, although Afghan capacity-building is a critical task, these policies 
simply represent a recommended adjustment to current efforts in selected ANDS sectors. 
These policies are not intended to replace the overarching ANDS, its mechanisms for 
implementation, or the ongoing efforts in the Governance pillar of the ANDS.  
The risk that the Afghans could be exploited by large foreign firms is another 
possible source of concern. However, this possibility has been considered by the GIRoA, 
and its answer is given in the ANDS: “Given the limited capacities in the public sector 
and in the nascent domestic private sector, much of this effort will focus on trying to 
encourage foreign firms with the expertise [and] ability to manage risk and access to 
financial resources to take advantage of the many opportunities that exist for investment 
in Afghanistan.”337 
The values of the EU donors would probably lead to cause consternation over the 
development of coal and asbestos value chains, given their impact on the environment 
and associated hazards. However, the DAC’s Strategies for Sustainable Development 
states, “The commitment and involvement of the private sector...is dependent on how 
well the strategy responds to the motivations of these groups.”338 If a market for coal 
exists and private investors want to leverage it, there is a case to be made for doing so.339 
EU donors should also be circumspect about applying Western values to a developing 
country like Afghanistan. Significant poverty reduction effects through sustainable 
economic growth must be balanced with the ideals practiced in Western nations. 
However, EU and other donors can certainly prioritize the projects undertaken. 
Enhancement of coal and asbestos value chains should ideally be a last resort for donors 
                                                 
336 World Bank, “Investment Climate,” vii, 8–10, 19. The top six constraints to businesses, in order, 
were: “(1) weak policy enforcement; (2) poor provision of electricity; (3) crime, theft and disorder; (4) 
corruption; (5) access to land; and (6) access to finance.” See also World Bank, "Doing Business 2010 
Afghanistan: Comparing Regulation in 183 Economies,” Reports and Papers – Doing Business. 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/CountryProfiles/AFG.pdf (accessed February 26, 2010). 28–31. 
The IMF ranks Afghanistan as 160 out of 183 global economies in ease of “doing business,” with 
Afghanistan ranking last in the world at 183 in three of ten key indicators, while ranking below 149 in all 
but three indicators.  
337 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” 8. 
338 OECD, “Sustainable Development,” 39. 
339 USGS, “Coal Resources of Afghanistan,” 1. The USGS estimated the 2005 coal production in 
Afghanistan to be about 220,000 tons per year. This indicates an existing value chain which could be 
enhanced.  
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and Afghans alike. Yet, the question of whether they should be summarily ignored should 
be resolved through a careful analysis by all of the relevant stakeholders involved. 
The challenge of how the EU donors could best leverage Afghanistan’s large-
scale resources and value chains must be considered. Proposing that the EU donors 
provide billions of euros to develop the Hajigak Iron Deposit in the same manner as the 
China Metallurgical Group’s investment in the Anyak Copper Deposit would not be 
realistic. However, the EU donors could focus on these types of projects in a scalable 
manner. Further studies of natural resources could be completed. EU donors could assist 
the Afghan Ministry of Mines by bringing in foreign investors. EU donors could work 
with the relevant Provincial Development Councils and governors to reshape the PDPs in 
the manner discussed in this chapter. They could also create regional development 
strategies after the “Nangarhar Inc” model in coordination with the GIRoA that would set 
the conditions for private and foreign investors to flourish. 
Finally, because of the political challenges associated with creating a completely 
unified and coordinated EU development strategy, the European Commission and the 
Council of the European Union might find it advisable to enlist the aid of some of the 
larger EU member state donors in addressing these themes. The European Commission 
(EC) contributes only 25% of the total EU donor aid in Afghanistan. However, when the 
EC’s contributions are considered together with those of Germany and the UK that figure 
jumps to 57%. The addition of the contributions of Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden brings the total to 93% of EU donor aid.340 If the EC, 
and a number of the key EU member state donors agreed to a change, that momentum 
could increase the probability of the other EU donors following suit.   
F. CONCLUSION 
The EU donors have the potential to achieve significant effects by leveraging 
large-scale projects and value chains that could generate sustainable, long-term economic 
growth in Afghanistan. However, these donors have not yet placed the appropriate 
                                                 
340 European Commission, EU Blue Book 2009: The EU and Afghanistan, http://www.delafg 
.ec.europa.eu/en/downloadable_documents/EUBlueBookAfg_2009.pdf (accessed November 20, 2009). 5. 
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emphasis on economic and private sector growth, regardless of the stated importance of 
these factors. This analysis indicates that an adjustment to the EU donors’ strategy would 
be advantageous. 
The rationale for a change in strategy is compelling. On the political side, leaders 
within the EU should acknowledge that the current EU development strategies have not 
achieved effects commensurate with the capabilities of the EU donors. This may be due 
to the inability or unwillingness of the EU donors to unite and address critical long-term 
projects with significant growth potential. Other key stakeholders, such as the United 
Nations Secretary General, the UNAMA SR-SG, and the Afghan government (through 
the ANDS) have indicated that long-term projects have been neglected. This is also 
probably one of the reasons why the United States has adjusted its development strategy 
to more fully address regional strategies that encompass value chains and natural 
resources. Acting together, the EU donors would be well situated to address this shortfall.  
On the development agency side, a greater emphasis on sustainable economic 
growth is clearly indicated. Given the fact that the EU donors are providing an 
unbalanced amount of weight on short-term projects, it is clear that a rebalancing of 
priorities in favor of projects that promote sustainable economic growth with the private 
sector in the lead should be a pressing concern for policy makers in the European Union. 
By implementing the policies described in the “Nangarhar Inc” case study, EU donors 
could begin integrating regional development strategies with the Afghan government. 
Combined with an enabling legal and political environment, these strategies have the 
potential to reduce poverty in Afghanistan by contributing to sustainable economic 
growth.  
The possible long-term benefits of this shift in EU development strategy are 
significant. High Afghan employment rates could reduce the Afghan reliance on poppy 
production for subsistence, and criminal and insurgent activity could be significantly 
reduced—both from the lack of employable fighters as well as from the livelihoods other 
than poppy production provided by economic growth. The inability of insurgent groups 
to draw from an unemployed Afghan base of fighters could also assist in stability and 
security efforts. Long-term benefits might include widespread and sustainable poverty-
 135
reduction effects, and a decreased reliance on international aid with an associated 
reduction of intervention by the EU and other donors. These compelling arguments 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The European Union (EU) could make its development strategy in Afghanistan 
more effective by addressing two major themes: coordination between the institutions of 
the EU and the member states, and the pursuit of sustainable economic growth through 
regional development strategies.341 The rationale and need for enhanced coordination is 
clear, and this issue is well known and much discussed. The theme of sustainable 
economic growth through regional development strategies is not as widely discussed, but 
the grounds for pursuing this concept are equally strong.  
The wide spectrum of experience within the European Union and its member 
states is an asset in many regards. The 25 EU member states active in Afghanistan (all 
except Cyprus and Malta) have contributed to the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS) and its predecessors in various and diverse ways, often at the direction 
of distinct national government agencies. However, this same diversity among the EU’s 
member states has also proved to be a hindrance to effectiveness. Jo Coelmont remarks 
that the EU member states have “showed solidarity right from the start by providing 
military, civil and financial support but—with a few exceptions such as the UK—remain 
absent from the strategic debate.”342 Disparate objectives and modes of action have 
prevented the institutions and member states of the EU from rallying behind a unified and 
coordinated strategy that could provide effects in Afghanistan for the Union. The EU’s 
status as the world’s largest aid donor and the second-largest donor in Afghanistan has 
been misleading because in Afghanistan, there has been no “European Union” 
development strategy—only a group of EU donors pursuing different strategies in the 
same country. The poor coordination of the EU donors has contributed to the problem of 
aid ineffectiveness.  
                                                 
341 As noted in Chapter IV, “regional” development strategies refers to plans that encompass 
geographic regions within Afghanistan, such as mineral resources that span more than one province. 
342 Coelmont, End State Afghanistan, 3. Jo Coelmont is a Senior Associate Fellow at EGMONT, the 
Belgian-based Royal Institute for International Relations. 
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As discussed in Chapter III, the solutions provided by the formal appointment and 
support of a “super envoy” could alleviate much of the EU aid ineffectiveness. This 
change would not be easy, as EU donors would be loath to change direction from their 
present course. Some leaders of EU member states would also resist relinquishing control 
of a portion of their donor funds, regardless of the potential benefits. The fact that aid 
effectiveness in Afghanistan is objectively a more pressing long-term collective interest 
of the EU than advancing narrow national interests is worth underscoring because a large 
portion of the resistance to a unified strategy has come from the EU member states.  
Chapter IV examines a potential realignment of priorities by the EU donors. The 
short-term direct poverty reduction projects pursued by the EU donors in Afghanistan in 
the early years of the international intervention that began in 2001 were logical. The 
needs of the Afghans were pressing and immediate, and an imbalance in favor of short-
term over long-term projects was sensible and logical. Nearly nine years later, analysis 
shows that this continuing imbalance in favor of short-term projects should be corrected 
by launching long-term projects designed to promote sustainable economic growth in 
Afghanistan.  
The EU has important programs that contribute to long-term effects in Afghan-
istan, such as those in Governance, Justice, Rule of Law, etc. Yet, in view of the stated 
importance of private-sector-led sustainable economic growth to the long-term prospects 
of Afghanistan, it is difficult to comprehend why the EU development programs have 
remained so disconnected from those key concepts. For example, the Country Strategy 
Paper for Afghanistan states that the European Commission (EC) is focusing on areas 
“where the EC has a clear value-added and where there is a lack of other major 
donors.”343 This is logical, but the EU donors consistently favor short-term “band-aid” 
projects in the Economic and Social Development pillar of the Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) over those that would contribute to long-term sustainable 
economic growth and that could lead to an independent Afghanistan and a reduction in 
the need for international support. Except for the agricultural value chain, on which the 
                                                 
343 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007–2013,” 
Europa – External Relations. 2007–2013. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/csp/ 
07_13_en.pdf (accessed July 28, 2009). 18 (italics added). 
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United States is now focusing, economic value chains in Afghanistan are severely 
underdeveloped due to the disconnect between the ANDS and the Provincial 
Development Plans (PDPs). For example, the tremendous potential of the Afghan mining 
industry has only been leveraged to 1%.344 There is a “lack of other major donors” in this 
and other potential value chains in Afghanistan. If the EU could muster its resources in a 
coordinated manner, it could act more effectively as the second largest donor in 
Afghanistan and could provide a “clear value-added” by addressing large-scale projects 
beyond the capabilities of nearly all other donors in Afghanistan.  
This fact also illustrates the complementarities of the two principal findings of 
this thesis. As noted in Chapter IV, without pursuing long-term solutions that enable the 
private sector to generate sustainable economic growth, there can be no viable long-term 
exit strategy for international donors. 
Regardless of the level of integration with the United Nations Assistance Mission 
to Afghanistan (UNAMA), EU donors who revise the EU development strategy into a 
unified plan could well choose to do so in a manner that emphasizes EU priorities. 
Specific priorities for the European Union would then include:  
1. Agreeing that effective aid coordination in Afghanistan is more important 
than maintaining the autonomy of disparate EU donor development strategies. This 
agreement could lead to identifying and empowering an EU “super envoy” and 
determining the appropriate level of EU donor funds and project control to relinquish to 
an EU “super envoy” for greater effectiveness. 
2. Agreeing to begin correcting the imbalance between short-term and long-
term projects in an effort to promote sustainable economic growth. This would include 
identifying which funding channels—such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
(ARTF) through “unpreferenced ARTF” funding—are best suited to draw from to 
augment funding for long-term projects. 
                                                 
344 World Bank, “Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan: Mining as a Source of Growth,” Report 
#28231-AF, 3/2004. 1, cited in United States. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 
“Quarterly Report to Congress,” Reports to Congress. January 30, 2010. 
http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Default.aspx (accessed March 3, 2010). 108. 
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3.  Investigating the use of “Nangarhar Inc”-type plans with the potential to 
leverage economic value chains in EU donor focus areas in Afghanistan. This could be 
done most advantageously in cooperation with the government of Afghanistan and the 
Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB). 
4. Promoting the inclusion of these tenets into the PDPs to bridge the gap 
between the PDPs and the ANDS.  
5. Agreeing to consider projects that offer a “return on investment” in terms 
of sustainable economic development, promote the ability of the private sector to lead 
sustainable economic growth in Afghanistan, and are beyond the reach of other donors 
with relatively smaller budgets and less developed skill sets. 
Since EU donors already agree that improved coordination is vitally important in 
Afghanistan, the first recommendation might be regarded as little more than a formality. 
More importantly, the EU has recognized that the time to act is now. The December 2009 
statement by the Council of the European Union entitled Strengthening EU Action in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan affirmed that “strategies alone will not suffice. Now, more than 
ever, implementation and action are required.”345 The imbalance in the EU strategy is 
clear. The method to correct this imbalance is evident. By creating a unified strategy 
under an EU “super envoy” or similar mechanism, and applying the lessons learned from 
the “Nangarhar Inc” model, the European Union could pursue a vastly more effective 
development strategy in Afghanistan.  
As with NATO, the stakes for the European Union are high; the price for “failure 
in Afghanistan,” however defined, could be devastating to the Union. It would certainly 
validate the claim by William Wallace that the EU is suffering from a “loss of a sense of 
shared direction…and the decline in both the legitimacy and efficiency of the Brussels 
 
 
                                                 
345 Council of the European Union, Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14064.en09.pdf (accessed December 6, 2009). 4. 
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institutions.”346 The European Union has ambitiously expanded its sphere of influence 
across the globe, but it has simultaneously stumbled in Afghanistan due to an inability to 
effectively cooperate.  
Yet, the benefits of a more successful EU intervention in Afghanistan could be 
compelling. In the near term, a more unified and better coordinated EU development 
strategy could provide a model to be emulated by the rest of the donors in Afghanistan. 
As Daniel Korski of the European Council on Foreign Relations states, the EU member 
states and their collective institutions could present “a united front so as to encourage 
other donors to set aside their narrow national interests.”347 In the long term, effective 
unity in action could show that the European Union is more than an experiment that is 
doomed to be relegated to a permanently sub-optimal plateau by the politics of the 
member states.  
When the policy makers of the European Union decide that the importance of a 
unified, effective, long-term, and sustainable development strategy supersedes narrow 
national and institutional interests, the rationale to make the difficult choices necessary to 
implement this strategy may be compelling enough to tip the balance. When the political 
and financial costs of failure in Afghanistan are compared with the benefits of a 
successful intervention, the merits of the potential changes analyzed in this thesis deserve 
the strongest possible consideration by the leaders of the European Union.  
                                                 
346 William Wallace, “The Collapse of British Foreign Policy,” International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1. 
2005. 61. 
347 Daniel Korski, “Afghanistan: Europe's Forgotten War,” January 31, 2008. 
http://ecfr.3cdn.net/fcdc73b8da7af85936_q8m6b5o4j.pdf (accessed July 28, 2009). 30. 
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